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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the things that happened in the first couple of years that I was a 
reporter [for the Civil Rules Advisory Committee] was there appeared on 
the scene something called the Competitiveness Commission, which was led 
by Vice President Quayle on the appointment of President [George H.W.] 
Bush, and I attended a couple of their sessions, and one of the things that I 
was asked informally on such events was couldn’t we just get rid of Rules 
26 through 37 [the discovery rules].  Wouldn’t that make the whole system 
a whole lot better if we just got rid of discovery, because it costs a whole lot 
of money, and it makes American business less profitable, and consequently 
we can’t compete as well in the international global market.  And we were 
hearing a little about this sort of thing just a few minutes ago, an echo of 
that same notion. 
—Professor Paul Carrington, speaking to the Civil Rules Advisory 
2
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Committee in November 2013.
1
 
For decades, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (Advisory 
Committee) has garnered passage of amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) that have incrementally narrowed discovery 
in the service of the Advisory Committee’s stated effort to combat the 
alleged “cost and delay” of civil litigation.  More of the same are on 
their way to Congress now.2   
It is time to state clearly what is going on: in the classical David-and-
Goliath lawsuit brought by an individual person against an institutional 
defendant, these pending amendments hurt David and help Goliath more 
than any previous round of amendments to the FRCP.  The individual-
versus-institution case, not coincidentally, is the most common lawsuit 
filed in federal district court today, and its prevalence has only grown 
over the past twenty-five years.3  Defense organizations drafted and 
tirelessly lobbied for most of the pending amendments, and they won.4  
The Advisory Committee sought “early and active judicial case 
management,”5 but settled for arbitrary reductions in a couple of 
 
 1. Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Before the 
Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 113th Cong. 56–57 (Nov. 7, 2013), transcript available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees (download Civil Rules 
Public Hearing Transcript Washington DC) [hereinafter Nov. 2013 Hearing]. 
2. AMENDMENTS ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT – PENDING CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW, 
available at U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/congress-materials [hereinafter 
Pending Amendments]. The pending amendments were first published in August 2013.  Minutes of June 
2013 Meeting of the Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, at 11, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/committee-rules-practice-and-
procedure-june-2013.  The amendments were slightly modified after vociferous public comment, and 
then unanimously approved by the Advisory Committee in April 2014 and by the Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (commonly called the Standing Committee) in May 2014.  Memorandum 
from David G. Campbell to Jeffrey S. Sutton (May 2, 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-may-2014 [hereinafter 
May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep.]; Minutes of May 2014 Meeting of the Comm. on Rules of Practice & 
Procedure, at 5–7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-
minutes/committee-rules-practice-and-procedure-may-2014.  Without any discussion, the full Judicial 
Conference of the United States approved the amendments at its meeting in September 2014.  2014 
Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Pending Rules Amendments, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/recent-and-proposed-amendments-federal-rules-
annual-report-2014.  After suggesting two changes in the proposed Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 
4(m) and Rule 84, the Supreme Court approved the amendments and transmitted them to Congress on 
April 29, 2015.  See Memorandum from James C. Duff to Scott S. Harris, April 2, 2015, in Pending 
Amendments [hereinafter Duff Memorandum].  Without congressional action, the amendments will take 
effect on December 1, 2015.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a). 
 3. Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1181. 
4.  See, e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Background, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
http://www.lfcj.com/federal-rules-of-civil-procedure.html  (“LCJ’s advocacy for the currently pending 
package of amendments to the rules governing discovery began in 2010.”). 
5.  Memorandum from David G. Campbell to Jeffrey S. Sutton, May 8, 2013, at 4, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-
3
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deadlines.  For no good reason, the amendments will reduce the length 
of time within which plaintiffs must effectuate service of process and 
grant defendants a corresponding gift of a reduction in the statute of 
limitations.6  A scheduling conference with the judge is still not 
required.7   
In addition, the amendments represent corporate defendants’ victory 
in the thirty-year war to limit the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) by 
slicing out language that nearly every lawyer today learned in law 
school and enshrining “proportionality” as part of the definition of, 
rather than a limitation on, the scope of discovery.8  The advent of e-
discovery simply gave defendants a new verse to sing in the same 30-
year-old tune about the burden of discovery.   
The new limitations on discovery will give busy trial judges more 
reasons to deny requests to exceed the presumptive limits of ten 
depositions and twenty-five interrogatories.9  The amendments will 
make it more difficult for a plaintiff such as Laura Zubulake, in her 
discrimination case that profoundly influenced the law of e-discovery, to 
obtain an adverse inference jury instruction as a sanction for the loss of 
electronic evidence by the defendant.10  Perhaps most far-reaching of all, 
the amendments will simply wipe out a host of official forms that the 
original Advisory Committee promulgated with the FRCP in 1938, on 
the thin excuse that the Advisory Committee wants to “get out of the 
forms business.”11  In fact, many interpret the move as silently signaling 
ratification of the heightened pleading standard imposed on plaintiffs by 
the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.12     
The amendments’ mostly anti-plaintiff effect is evidenced by a stark 
split in the public reaction, with plaintiff’s lawyers almost unanimously 
against most of the amendments and defendant’s lawyers almost 
 
procedure-may-2013 [hereinafter May 2013 Advisory Comm. Rep.]. 
6.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
7.  See infra Part II.A.4. 
8.  See infra Part II.C.2.  The word “proportional” does not appear in the text of any of the 
current discovery rules.  It is a shorthand used to encapsulate the cost/benefit considerations currently 
contained in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C).  
9.  See infra Part II.C.4. 
10. See LAURA A. ZUBULAKE, ZUBULAKE’S E-DISCOVERY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF MY QUEST 
FOR JUSTICE (2012); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
11.  See infra Part II.C.6. 
 12. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009).  See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.  One of the additions that the Supreme Court 
requested be made to the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 84 was a comment that the abrogation of all 
the forms was not intended to change the pleading standard.  Duff Memorandum, supra note 2.  The 
comment will likely have as much effect as a parent telling a child to “do as I say, not as I do.” 
4
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unanimously in favor.13  But the Advisory Committee seemed 
astoundingly indifferent to the polarized public reaction to the proposed 
amendments.  One Advisory Committee member dismissed the stories 
told at the public hearings by plaintiffs’ lawyers about their need for 
discovery as “Queen-For-A-Day issues,” a reference to a 50-year-old 
daytime television show in which women tearfully told their real-life 
sob stories to vie for prizes.14 
Given the makeup of the Advisory Committee and the Standing 
Committee, none of this is surprising.  The members of both committees 
were all appointed by Chief Justice John Roberts, and except for a few 
tokens, they are ideologically predisposed to think like Federalist 
Society members, demographically predisposed to think like elite white 
males, or experientially predisposed to think like corporate defense 
lawyers.15  As long as Chief Justice Roberts has the power to make these 
appointments, this situation is unlikely to change.  
This Article will begin in Part II by surveying the pending FRCP 
amendments, which will, in all likelihood, become effective on 
December 1, 2015.  I divide my review into amendments that are not 
likely to have much practical effect (those addressed to “judicial 
management” and “cooperation”), amendments that disadvantage 
individual plaintiffs and advantage institutional defendants (most of the 
discovery amendments, the time to serve process, and the abrogation of 
the forms), and the one amendment that might slightly benefit plaintiffs 
(allowing earlier requests for documents).  Part III provides an overview 
of government statistics on the federal courts, which the Advisory 
Committee failed to mention in all the years it has been considering 
these amendments, and compares those actual statistics with the so-
called “empirical studies” commissioned to support these amendments.  
Other than the study by the Federal Judicial Center,16 which the 
Advisory Committee largely downplayed and ignored, the flawed 
methodology of these “studies” begged the question of whether any of 
the judges on the Advisory Committee would have admitted them into 
evidence under the Daubert standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.17   
 
 13. See Patricia W. Moore, More Public Comments (Including Mine) on the Proposed FRCP 
Amendments, CIVIL PROCEDURE & FEDERAL COURTS BLOG (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/01/more-public-comments-including-mine-on-the-
proposed-frcp-amendments.html. 
 14. See infra Part IV.A. 
 15. See infra Part IV.B. 
16.  EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009) [hereinafter FJC CASE-BASED REPORT]. 
17.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), codified in FED. R. 
EVID. 702. 
5
Moore: The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civ
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1088 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
Part IV sketches the public reaction to the amendments, which was 
almost perfectly polarized between individual plaintiffs (against the 
amendments) and institutional defendants (for the amendments).  The 
Advisory Committee’s and Standing Committee’s seeming indifference 
to the negative public reaction from plaintiffs’ lawyers stems from their 
primary ideological orientation with the hard-right version of the 
modern Republican party, as evidenced by many of the committee 
members’ affiliation with the Federalist Society and the defense-
oriented Lawyers for Civil Justice (LCJ).18  At present, the Chief Justice 
has the power to appoint all the members of the federal rules 
committees.  There is no explicit constitutional,19 statutory,20 or rules 
authority for this unbridled power—it results from a long-forgotten 
unofficial “compromise.”21  The Article concludes by forecasting future 
amendments sought by defense and business interests that may be 
pushed through unless the mechanism for appointment of federal rules 
committee members is changed.   
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PENDING AMENDMENTS AS APPROVED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT 
The latest in the seemingly never-ending amendments curbing 
discovery began with the portentously-titled “Duke Conference,” an 
invitation-only gathering of about 200 federal judges, practicing 
lawyers, and legal academics at Duke University School of Law on May 
10–11, 2010.22  The Standing Committee requested the Advisory 
 
18.  As to LCJ’s name, think “War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength.” 
19.  Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the 
Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1636 (2006) (“the part of the 
Constitution devoted to establishing the judicial branch makes no mention of the office of the Chief 
Justice”).  For an argument that only the Supreme Court as a body, not the Chief Justice alone, may 
constitutionally make appointments of "inferior officers," which may include members of committees 
such as the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, see James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment 
of Inferior Officers, and the “Court of Law” Requirement, 107 NW. L. REV. 1125 (2013). 
20. The Rules Enabling Act provides that the “Judicial Conference” may authorize the 
appointment of rules committees.  28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (“The Judicial Conference may authorize the 
appointment of committees to assist the Conference by recommending rules to be prescribed under 
sections 2072 and 2075 of this title”).  It does not specify who is to appoint members of those 
committees once established. 
21.  A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long 
Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 686 (1995) (in what became known as the “Queen 
Mary Compromise,” the decision that “the Chief Justice, as Chair of the Judicial Conference, should 
appoint the committees” was made by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Tom C. Clark, and Chief Judge 
John J. Parker of the Fourth Circuit, during their cruise on the Queen Mary to attend the 1957 American 
Bar Association Convention). 
 22. 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. COURTS, 
6
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Committee to sponsor the conference “to explore the current costs of 
civil litigation, particularly discovery, and to discuss possible 
solutions.”23  The dean of Duke Law School, David F. Levi, who 
welcomed the conference-goers in the initial session,24 was formerly the 
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of California.25  Dean Levi’s role in 
the Duke Conference was not an accident.  Formerly the chair of the 
Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee, Dean Levi’s work to 
limit discovery stretches back to his days as a law clerk for Justice 
Lewis Powell in the early 1980s.26   
On the hypothesis that civil litigation in federal court was subject to 
an unacceptable level of cost and delay, and that discovery was largely 
to blame, a number of so-called “empirical studies” were commissioned 
for the Duke Conference, including several conducted by the Federal 
Judicial Center.27  The Committee gave the impression that it was 
writing on a clean slate, charting new territory in improving civil justice.  
Remarkably, it did not even mention the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990 (CJRA),28 which one scholar described as “the most ambitious 
effort to experiment with procedures for reducing expense and delay in 
civil litigation during the 200-year history of the federal courts.”29  
The CJRA required each federal district court to implement a “civil 
justice delay and expense reduction plan,” the purposes of which were 
“to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor 
discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes.”30  To draft such a plan, each 
 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/archives/projects-rules-committees/2010-civil-
litigation-conference.aspx (last visited May 11, 2015).  The U.S. Courts website contains the conference 
agenda and the conference panelists, but not a list of conference attendees.  See id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Civil Litigation Conference, DUKE LAW (May 10, 2010), https://law.duke.edu/video/civil-
litigation-conference-1/.  
 25. Faculty Profile of David F. Levi, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/fac/levi/ (last visited May 
11, 2015). 
 26. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of 
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 553 (2001) (describing former Judge Levi’s “key role” in the passage of 
the 2000 amendments to the FRCP, which limited the scope and other aspects of discovery).  Judge Levi 
chaired the Discovery Subcommittee, begun in 1996, leading to the 2000 amendments.  Id.  Justice 
Powell “damn[ed] the 1980 Amendments as ‘tinkering’ and [repeatedly asserted] that parties seeking 
discovery were taking unfair advantage of defendants.”  Id. at 553–54.  See also S. Rep. 101–416 (Aug. 
3, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6810–11 (describing Justice Powell’s sharp criticism of 
the discovery rules in 1980 as being “unfair to defendants”). 
27.  See 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, supra note 2. 
28.  See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 471–82 until it was to sunset on Dec. 1, 1997).   
29.  Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 547 (1998). 
30.  28 U.S.C. § 471. 
7
Moore: The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civ
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1090 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
district court appointed a committee of judges, attorneys, and academics 
to analyze their district’s docket and write a report suggesting ways to 
decrease the time and expense of civil litigation.  The end result, 
accomplished less than twenty years before the Duke Conference, was 
that “[a]ll ninety-four federal district courts undertook searching 
introspection of their civil and criminal caseloads and then adopted and 
applied measures that they believed would best conserve resources.”31 
Perhaps the Committee did not mention these ninety-four reports 
from around the country concerning exactly the same things to be 
discussed at the Duke Conference because, having already decided it 
wanted to restrict discovery further, it did not like some of the 
reports’ conclusions.   For example, the CJRA-mandated plan for the 
Northern District of Texas, which includes Dallas, concluded that the 
three “chief reasons for the delay in the civil docket” were a 
substantial increase in criminal cases, a shortage of judges, and an 
increase in the amount of trial time devoted to criminal cases.
32
  A 
careful analysis of the federal district courts’ caseload for the past 
twenty-five years shows that this is still true: the main reason for the 
delay in the civil docket is an increase in criminal cases.
33
  
In connection with the Duke Conference’s study of “cost and delay” 
in civil litigation, the Committee also did not mention that the CJRA 
required the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to 
maintain statistics on (among other things) the number of motions 
pending more than six months and the number of cases pending more 
than three years.34  Nor did the Committee appear to consult the AO’s 
caseload statistics, which show neither a rising civil docket nor a 
galloping case disposition time.35  It does not even appear that much, if 
any, case law was researched to support or dispute certain assumptions 
that were made, such as whether judges and parties employ the 
 
31.  Tobias, supra note 29, at 547. 
32. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 
(2002), at 3, available at http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/pdf/cjedrp.pdf (last visited June 9, 2015).  See 
also, e.g., EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND REDUCTION PLAN (1991), 
at 2, available at https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/cjraplan/cjraplan.pdf (last visited June 10, 
2015) (identifying judicial vacancies and an increase in criminal cases as the two main causes of delay 
in the civil docket). 
33.  Moore, supra note 3, at 1181. 
34.  28 U.S.C. § 476.  For recent examples of these semiannual reports, see Civil Justice Reform 
Act Report, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/civil-justice-
reform-act-report.  See also infra Part III.C.  
35.  Moore, supra note 3, at 1181; Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem For 
and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1826 (2014). 
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“proportionality” principles of Rule 26(b)(2).36   
Rather than doing any of that, it was apparently easier to ask several 
different organizations to conduct nonrandom opinion surveys of self-
selected lawyers to give their overall impressions of discovery, and then 
to host 200 participants to listen to the results and brainstorm afresh for 
two days on the Duke campus.    
The Committee later summarized what happened at the Duke 
Conference in separate reports to the Chief Justice and to the Standing 
Committee.37  The report to the Chief Justice mentioned only a few 
possible rules changes, the first concerning pleading standards in light of 
Twombly and Iqbal.38  As for possible rules amendments related to 
discovery, the report mentioned the problem of privilege logs, the extent 
of the parties’ preservation obligations, the culpability required for 
spoliation sanctions, the reworking of the 26(a)(1) initial disclosures,39 
and “ongoing and detailed judicial case-management.”40 The report 
stated that some participants suggested “limiting the number of 
document requests and the number of requests for admission.”41  
Notably, the report specifically stated that the definition of the scope of 
discovery did not need to be changed.42  
The proposed amendments to the FRCP that were first published for 
comment in August 2013 veered far from the points made in the report 
to the Chief Justice.  Probably the most attention-grabbing of the 
 
36. Compare, e.g., May 2013 Advisory Comm. Rep, supra note 5, at 10 (asserting without 
citation that the concept of proportionality “is not invoked often enough to dampen excessive discovery 
demands”) with Summary of Testimony and Comments, August 2013 Civil Rules Published for 
Comment, at 74, following May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2 [hereinafter Summary of 
Testimony and Comments] (testimony of plaintiffs’ attorney Lea Malani Bays) (“Rule 26(b)(2)(B)(iii) is 
being utilized.  It has been cited in more than 100 opinions in the last six months”). 
37. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND THE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, 111TH CONG. REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION  (2010) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/reporttothechiefjusticepdf; Memorandum from Mark R. Kravitz to Lee H. 
Rosenthal (May 2010) [hereinafter May 2010 Advisory Comm. Rep.], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-
procedure-may-2010.  
38. REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 5–7.  See also May 2010 Advisory Comm. 
Rep., supra note 37, at 2–4. 
39.  REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 7–9. 
40.  Id. at 10. 
41.  Id. at 9. 
42.  Id. at 8 (“In 2000, the basic scope of discovery defined in Rule 26(b)(1) was amended . . . But 
there was no demand at the [Duke] Conference for a change to the rule language; there is no clear case 
for present reform. There is continuing concern that the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2), 
added in 1983, have not accomplished what was intended. Again, however, there was no suggestion that 
this rule language should be changed”). 
9
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amendments as originally published for comment43 were a proposed 
reduction in the presumptive number of permitted depositions from ten 
per side to five per side, a proposed reduction in the permitted length of 
a deposition from seven hours to six hours,44 a proposed reduction in the 
presumptive number of permitted interrogatories from twenty-five to 
fifteen, and a proposed unprecedented limitation, to twenty-five, on 
requests for admission.  Some in the academic community suspected 
that the proposed numerical reductions were a stalking horse designed to 
focus opposition away from the real prize of the general limitations on 
the scope of discovery.   
The preliminary draft of the amendments generated an unprecedented 
volume of public comment.  Over 2,300 comments were submitted,45 
and about 120 witnesses testified before the Advisory Committee over 
three days of public hearings.46  
The Advisory Committee has continued the Duke Conference’s 
mantra “that the disposition of civil actions could be improved, reducing 
cost and delay, by advancing cooperation among the parties, 
proportionality in the use of available procedures, and early and active 
judicial case management.”47  Set aside for now that the Duke 
Conference and the Advisory Committee began by assuming, rather than 
investigating, an unacceptable level of “cost and delay.”48  How do the 
proposed amendments link to the three “solutions” of cooperation, 
proportionality, and early judicial management?   
A. Pending Amendments Supposedly Directed at “Judicial 
Management” 
One of the three Duke “themes” was the need for “early and active 
 
 43. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, 
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 267 (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations/gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0001 (select “pdf”) 
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].  
 44. Id. An earlier version of the proposal would have reduced the time to four hours, but the 
version as published for comment was six hours. 
 45. See Comments, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-
0002 (last visited May 11, 2015).  Some of these comments are duplicates. 
 46. The hearings occurred on November 7, 2013, January 9, 2014, and February 7, 2014.  
Transcripts of the hearings are available for download on the federal judiciary’s website, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed-amendments.aspx.   
 47. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 3.   
48.  The assumption of, rather than the investigation or definition of, “cost and delay” has been a 
continuing feature of civil justice “reform” efforts.  See, e.g., Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay 
Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 ORE. L. REV. 1085, 1095 (2012). 
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judicial case management,”49 a point on which lawyers for both 
plaintiffs and defendants agree.  In fact, for at least forty years, 
“[p]roponents of discovery reform have been calling continuously for 
earlier and more resolute judicial management of discovery.”50  But the 
only proposed rule changes addressed to “early and active” involvement 
by the judge actually do nothing to require such involvement.   
1. More Items Listed in “Permitted Contents” of a Scheduling 
Order 
The first change supposedly fostering “early and active judicial 
management” adds more items to the list in Rule 16(b)(3)(B) that 
includes the “permitted contents” of a scheduling order.  Rule 16 
currently requires the judge to issue a scheduling order early in the 
litigation.51  The only items that the rules currently require the judge to 
include in the scheduling order are limits on “the time to join other 
parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.”52  
The proposed amendments do not add any “required” items to the 
scheduling order.   
Instead, the proposal would add items to the “permitted contents” of 
the scheduling order.  Thus, the amended Rule 16 will suggest, but not 
require, that the judge may, if she wishes, include in the scheduling 
order the preservation of electronically stored information, the parties’ 
agreement regarding the nonwaiver of privilege under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502, and a requirement that the parties seek a court conference 
before filing a discovery motion:   
(3) Contents of the Order.  * * * 
(B) Permitted Contents.  The scheduling order may: * * * 
(iii) provide for disclosure, or discovery, or preservation of 
electronically stored information; 
(iv) include any agreements the parties reach for asserting 
claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
 
49.  May 2013 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 5, at 4. 
 50. John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 511 
(2000).  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory comm. notes to 1980 amendments (“In the judgment of 
the Committee [discovery] abuse can best be prevented by intervention by the court as soon as abuse is 
threatened.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory comm. notes to 2000 amendments (“The Committee has been 
informed repeatedly by lawyers that involvement of the court in managing discovery is an important 
method of controlling problems of inappropriately broad discovery.  Increasing the availability of 
judicial officers to resolve discovery disputes and increasing court management of discovery were both 
strongly endorsed by the attorneys surveyed by the Federal Judicial Center.”). 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1).  Local rules may exempt certain categories of actions from the 
scheduling order requirement.  Id. 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A). 
11
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material after information is produced, including agreements 
reached under Federal Rule of Evidence 502; 
(v) direct that before moving for an order relating to 




There is nothing really wrong with any of this, but Rule 16 already 
allows the judge to include all these items, and many judges already do 
so.  The existing six subparagraphs of Rule 16(b)(3)(B) already permit 
the scheduling order to “provide for disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information”; “to modify the extent of discovery”; 
to include no-privilege-waiver agreements; and to “include other 
appropriate matters.”54  Thus, the existing rule fully covers all of the 
proposed additions.   
Judge Paul Grimm, an Advisory Committee member, has a standard 
order on discovery that includes all these things and more.55  In 
particular, Judge Grimm’s standard discovery order requires a pre-
motion request for a conference on a discovery dispute.56  Other judges 
also require pre-motion court conferences for greater efficiency.57  The 
current rule presents no obstacle to a required pre-motion conference.58  
 
 53. Pending Amendments, supra note 2, at 51 (Rule 16(b)(3)(B)), unchanged from May 2014 
Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 18.  Proposed deletions from the current rule are struck through; 
proposed additions to the current rule are underlined.  The pending amendments include concomitant 
additions to Rule 26(f)(3), requiring the discovery plan to “state the parties’ views” on preservation of 
ESI and FRE 502, but not requiring any particular “view.”  See id. at 21. 
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B). 
 55. See Paul W. Grimm, United States District Judge, Discovery Order (Jan. 29, 2013), 
https://thesedonaconference.org/system/files/Judge%20Grimm%20Discovery%20Order.pdf.  Judge 
Grimm’s discovery order actually contains almost all of the proposed amendments, including some that 
were cut from the original proposals, like the reduction from 25 to 15 interrogatories. 
 56. Id. at 2. The standing order states in Paragraph 4: 
Discovery Motions Prohibited Without Pre-Motion Conference with the Court. 
a.  No discovery-related motion may be filed unless the moving party attempted in good faith, 
but without success, to resolve the dispute and has requested a pre-motion conference with the 
Court to discuss the dispute and to attempt to resolve it informally.  If the Court does not grant 
the request for a conference, or if the conference fails to resolve the dispute, then upon approval 
of the Court, a motion may be filed. 
 57. See, e.g., ZUBULAKE, supra note 10 (2012) (describing Judge Shira Schiendlin’s use of the 
procedure in her case); May 2011 Advisory Comm. Rep., at 59, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-
procedure-may-2011 (“pre-discovery-motion conferences are required by local rule or standing order of 
at least one judge in 37 districts”). 
 58. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 19 (“the decision whether to require such 
conferences is left to the discretion of the judge in each case.”). 
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/2
2015] THE ANTI-PLAINTIFF PENDING AMENDMENTS 1095 
2. No More Scheduling Conferences by Mail? 
The second proposed change to Rule 16(b) is almost silly: 
(1) Scheduling Order.  Except in categories of actions exempted by 
local rule, the district judge—or a magistrate judge when authorized 
by local rule—must issue a scheduling order: 
(A) after receiving the parties’ report under Rule 26(f); or 
(B) after consulting with the parties’ attorneys and any 
unrepresented parties at a scheduling conference [or ] by telephone, 
mail, or other means.
59
 
The Advisory Committee explains that “[a] scheduling conference is 
more effective if the court and parties engage in direct simultaneous 
communication.”60  The problem is that the change does nothing to 
require the judge to actually have a scheduling conference with the 
parties: the judge is still free to issue the scheduling order without 
conferencing with the parties.61  If “direct simultaneous communication” 
(and “early and active judicial management”) is what is desired, a better 
change would be to replace the “or” at the end of 16(b)(1)(A) with 
“and.”  In addition, despite the Advisory Committee Note suggesting 
that “[t]he conference may be held in person, by telephone, or by more 
sophisticated electronic means,”62 the deletion of “by telephone, mail, or 
other means” from the text may lead some judges or parties to conclude 
that the conference, if held, must actually be held in person, which may 
ironically lead to fewer “direct simultaneous communication[s]” than 
occur at present. 
3. Reduced Time to Issue Scheduling Order 
The time within which the district court judge must issue a scheduling 
order in the case is tied to service of process on the defendant under 
 
 59. Id. at 18.  There appears to be a very slight error in the pending amendments’ transcription of 
Rule 16(b)(1)(B): it omits the word “or” that I have inserted in brackets in the quote in text.  The current 
rule’s inclusion of the word “or” makes the phrase actually read: “a scheduling conference or by 
telephone, mail, or other means,” which sounds more sensible than “a scheduling conference 
by . . . mail.”  See FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH FORMS (Dec. 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practice-procedure (last visited June 11, 2015).   
 60. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 19. 
 61. The Advisory Committee stated in its May 2014 report to the Standing Committee that “[t]he 
rule text now requires ‘a scheduling conference,’” id. at 14, but that is misleading out of context.  
Neither the current nor the proposed new Rule 16 require that the judge actually hold a scheduling 
conference.  The report goes on to clarify this: “Rule 16(b)(1)(A) continues to allow the court to base a 
scheduling order on the parties’ report under Rule 26(f) without holding a conference.”  Id.   
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, advisory committee note to 1946 amendment. 
13
Moore: The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civ
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1096 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
Rule 4(m).63  As discussed below in Part II.C.1, the time to serve 
process will be shortened by thirty days, from 120 to 90 days.64  The 
time to issue the scheduling order has been correspondingly shortened 
by thirty days: 
[16(b)](2) Time to Issue.  The judge must issue the scheduling order 
as soon as practicable, but in any event unless the judge finds good 
cause for delay, the judge must issue it within the earlier of  120 90 
days after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 60 
days after any defendant has appeared.
65
  
The cumulative effect is that the scheduling order will potentially 
issue sixty days earlier than it does now.  This is shown in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1 assumes that the complaint is filed on January 6, 2014.  I 
have calculated deadlines under the current rules and under the proposed 
rules.  Please note that many of these dates are under the parties’ 
control, and therefore would be different than the dates I have calculated 
by strictly following the rules.  For example, the plaintiff may be able to 
serve the defendant before the last possible date.  The defendant may 
answer early, or obtain agreement from the plaintiff (or permission from 
the court) to answer late.  The parties may stipulate to a different time 
for the initial disclosures.  In addition, the court could set the scheduling 
conference earlier. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Deadlines under Existing FRCP and 
Proposed FRCP (all dates are in 2014 and assume the complaint 
was filed January 6, 2014) 
 Existing rules Proposed rules 
Defendant must be served.    May 6 April 7 
Defendant responds to complaint. May 27 April 28 
Rule 34 requests can be “delivered” 
under proposed rules or “served” 





26(f) conference must be held. August 4 June 6 
26(f) report and initial disclosures 
due. 
August 11 June 20 
 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2). 
          64. See May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 15. The Advisory Committee classifies 
the reduction of service time in pending Rule 4(m) as one of the changes addressing “early case 
management.”  See id. at 14–15.  Because service of process is entirely the plaintiff’s responsibility, 
with no apparent “management” by the judge, I have classified the proposed change to Rule 4(m) in this 
Article as an amendment that disadvantages plaintiffs in Part II.C.1 below.       
 65. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 18. 
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Court holds scheduling conference. Not required.  
No exact date set 
by rules. 
Not required.  No 
exact date set by 
rules. 
Court must issue scheduling order. August 25 June 27 
Response to Rule 34 request due. September 3 July 7 
 
As shown in Table 1, pending changes to Rules 26(d) and Rule 34 
(discussed below in Section II.D) allow the parties to “deliver” (not 
serve) Rule 34 document requests twenty-one days after service of 
process on the defendant.  The response to that Rule 34 request will not 
be due, however, until thirty days after the parties’ Rule 26(f) 
conference.  The rationale for the change is that the parties may have a 
more productive 26(f) conference if they have actual document requests 
to discuss.66 
Since the time for the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference is tied to the 
timing of the scheduling order under Rule 16(b),67 the Rule 26(f) 
conference is also moved up by thirty days—maybe.  A new provision 
allowing wiggle room for “good cause for delay” of the Rule 26(f) 
conference seems geared to accommodate institutional defendants: the 
Advisory Committee’s example of a reason for delay of the 26(f) 
conference is that “[l]itigation involving complex issues, multiple 
parties, and large organizations, public or private, may be more likely to 
need extra time to establish meaningful collaboration between counsel 
and the people who can supply the information needed to participate in a 
useful way.”68   
In addition, the time for initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) is 
tied to Rule 26(f)69 (which in turn is tied to Rule 16(b)), so theoretically 
the shortening of the time to issue a scheduling order also shortens the 
time to exchange initial disclosures.  The same safety valve of a delay in 
the scheduling order for good cause would also necessarily affect the 
initial disclosures, or the parties could simply agree on a later date for 
the disclosures.    
Finally, because the parties may not engage in formal discovery until 
after the Rule 26(f) conference,70 and that conference may potentially 
occur thirty days earlier than at present, the parties may be able to 
engage in discovery thirty days earlier as well.  To the extent that the 
plaintiff has no trouble in serving the defendant, the plaintiff might 
 
66.  See, e.g., May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 11, 25. 
67.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1). 
 68. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 19. 
69.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 
70.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
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welcome a thirty-day shortening of the time before which no formal 
discovery (except for a Rule 34 request) may be served, as well as the 
time to receive the defendant’s initial disclosures.  But the pending 
amendments, for the first time, will allow the judge to delay the issuance 
of the scheduling order for “good cause,”71 which may take the teeth out 
of the supposed thirty-day reduction.  
4. A Scheduling Conference Is Still Discretionary (and Still 
Unscheduled)  
Many commenters on the proposed amendments favored making a 
scheduling conference under Rule 16(b) mandatory.72  The pending 
amendments, however, continue to leave to the judge’s discretion 
whether to hold a scheduling conference at all, and if so, when.   
Giving the judge discretion to require a conference without specifying 
the time within which the conference must be held can lead “judicial 
haste that makes waste”73 at best and arbitrary exercises of judicial 
power at worst.  For example, in Hall v. Wiley,74 the judge issued a 
paperless order on the day after the complaint was filed (and before the 
defendant had been served), requiring that a scheduling conference be 
held “twenty (20) days after the filing of the first responsive pleading by 
the last responding defendant, or within sixty (60) days after the filing of 
the complaint, whichever occurs first.”  The order directed that if the 
defendant had not been served within sixty days, plaintiffs were to file a 
motion for an extension of the time to hold the scheduling conference.  
The order warned that “[f]ailure of counsel to file a joint scheduling 
report within the deadlines set forth above may result in dismissal,” but 
did not specifically state that failure to move for an extension of time to 
hold the scheduling conference would result in dismissal.75 
The plaintiffs were not able to effectuate service within sixty days 
because the defendant had moved to New York and they had not yet 
located his address.  But the plaintiffs failed to move for an extension of 
the scheduling conference, probably reasoning that since the defendant 
had not been served, there could be no conference.   
The court, sua sponte, with no prior notice to the plaintiffs other than 
the original paperless order, and without giving the plaintiffs a chance to 
respond, dismissed the case without prejudice approximately eighty-five 
 
71.  See May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 17. 
72.  See Summary of Testimony and Comments, supra note 36, at 22-23. 
 73. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 74. No. 2:10-cv-14196-FJL (S.D. Fla). 
 75. Id., Paperless Order (Aug. 4, 2010). 
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days after the filing of the complaint.76  Arguably, this dismissal 
violated the spirit, if not the letter, of current Rule 4(m), which allows 
the plaintiff 120 days to serve.  Moreover, the original paperless order 
did not give plaintiffs clear notice that the case would be dismissed if 
they did not move for an extension of time to have the scheduling 
conference when the defendant had not even been served.  
The hapless plaintiffs then moved for an extension of time to serve 
the defendant (even though their 120 days had not expired), which the 
judge denied.77  Undeterred, they finally served the defendant 
approximately 100 days after the filing of the complaint.  Alas, the 
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the case had already 
been dismissed; the court denied this motion as moot because, yes 
indeed, the case had already been dismissed.78 
Plaintiffs then moved to reopen the case, and defendant did not 
oppose, filing a response that stated that he would cooperate in filing a 
joint scheduling report.  The court actually denied this uncontested 
motion to reopen the case, too, stating, “As soon as the Report is filed, 
this case will be re-opened.”79 
The case was finally reopened seven and one-half months after the 
complaint was originally filed.  Each side had to incur the expense of 
two unnecessary motions or filings due to the judge’s initial “gotcha” 
order.  One cannot help but suspect that the primary reason for this 
judicial game-playing was to restart the clock on the time the case was 
pending.80  If a case is closed, then the time the case is counted as 
pending does not begin again until the case is reopened.      
To summarize the pending amendments supposedly addressing “early 
and active judicial management,” judges are not required to do anything 
more or anything differently than they are at present.  There are a few 
new suggestions about what can be included in a scheduling order, 
making explicit what is already implicit and what some judges are 
already including.  The date for issuing the scheduling order is shortened 
by as much as sixty days, but the burden of hurrying up is on the 
 
76.  Id., Paperless Order (Oct. 28, 2010). 
77. Id., Paperless Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time to File Serve [sic] Defendant 
(Nov. 12, 2010). 
78.  Id., Paperless Order Denying as Moot Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dec. 14, 2010). 
79.   Id., Paperless Order Denying Motion to Re-open Case (Jan. 11, 2011). 
 80. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: REPORT OF 
MOTIONS PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BENCH TRIALS SUBMITTED MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, 
BANKRUPTCY APPEALS PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL CASES 
PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, AND CIVIL CASES PENDING MORE THAN THREE YEARS ON MARCH 
31, 2010 1, 57 (2010) (“The CJRA requires a report, by judicial officer, of cases pending for more than 
three years in the district court.  A case becomes pending as of the date the case originally was filed in 
the district court or the date the case was reopened, whichever is later”).   
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plaintiff in serving process and the parties in holding the 26(f) meeting.  
The burden does not really fall on the judge, who usually has a pretty 
standard idea of what the scheduling order is going to say anyway.81  
The one change that might actually have produced more early judicial 
management was to require a scheduling conference, or at least make 
holding a scheduling conference the default position, giving the court 
discretion not to hold one in a particular case.  But the Advisory 
Committee chose not to change the rule not requiring the conference, 
proposing only that if the judge does hold one, it should not be by mail.    
B. Cooperation: Aspirational Proposal that Lacks Enforcement 
Mechanism 
1. The Pending Amendment to Rule 1 
The second of the three “themes” of the pending amendments was to 
“advanc[e] cooperation” among the parties.82  The only rule change that 
supposedly addresses cooperation is an addition to Rule 1 that does not 
actually use any form of the word “cooperation”:   
These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings 
in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.  They 
should be construed, and administered, and employed by the court and 
the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.
83   
Rule 1 remained substantively unchanged from its adoption in 1938 
until 1993, when the words “and administered” were inserted into the 
second sentence after the word “construed.”  The Advisory Committee 
Notes explained in 1993 that the addition of those words was “to 
recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority 
conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only 
fairly, but also without undue cost or delay.  As officers of the court, 
attorneys share this responsibility with the judge to whom the case is 
assigned.”
84
  Now, twenty years later, the Advisory Committee 
apparently feels that attorneys have snubbed this responsibility, and has 
added a reference to “the parties” in the text of the rule, rather than in 
the Committee Note.     
 
81. See, e.g., WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, STANDARD TRACK SCHEDULING ORDER, 
https://www.tnwd.uscourts.gov/forms-and-applications.php#lr162 (choose Local Rule 16.2 Scheduling 
Orders).  
82.  May 2013 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 5, at 4. 
83.  May 2014 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 17. 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory comm. notes to 1993 amendments (emphasis added). 
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The new pending Committee Note to Rule 1 is where the actual word 
“cooperate” appears:   
Rule 1 is amended to emphasize that just as the court should construe 
and administer these rules to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action, so the parties share the responsibility 
to employ the rules in the same way.  Most lawyers and parties 
cooperate to achieve these ends.  But discussions of ways to improve 
the administration of civil justice regularly include pleas to discourage 
over-use, misuse, and abuse of procedural tools that increase cost and 
result in delay.  Effective advocacy is consistent with—and indeed 
depends upon—cooperative and proportional use of procedure.
85
   
A later-revised version of the Committee Note added another 
paragraph: 
This amendment does not create a new or independent source of 




This addition to the Note apparently attempts to address concerns that 
the change to Rule 1 could lead parties to move for sanctions for 
violating a duty to cooperate.87  Although a mere statement in the 
Committee Note is not binding on courts if the rule change is adopted, 
the Committee’s intent that the change to Rule 1 creates no new 
sanctionable duty to cooperate is clear.  Thus, the parties are re-urged to 
cooperate, but there is no enforcement mechanism, as several witnesses 
recommended.88  Further, the Committee Note does not define or give 
an example of “cooperation,” stating only that it means “to discourage 
over-use, misuse, and abuse of procedural tools that increase cost and 
 
 85. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 86. Pending Amendments, supra note 2, at Rule 1.  
 87. The Advisory Committee had earlier dismissed concerns that the rule change would prompt 
“ill-founded attempts to seek sanctions for violating a duty to cooperate” or “the strategic use of ‘Rule 1 
motions.’” May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 16. 
 88. See, e.g., Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Before the Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 113th Cong. 143 (Jan. 2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees (download Civil Rules 
Public Hearing Transcript, Phoenix, AZ) [hereinafter Jan. 2014 Hearing] (statement of William 
Butterfield, plaintiffs’ attorney) (“Rule 1 has been tweaked to mention cooperation, but it provides no 
mechanism to require it.  Meaningful cooperation as set forth in various local rules and pilot programs 
would, in my opinion, do more than anything else to curb discovery expenses.”); id. at 231 (statement of 
Dennis Canty, plaintiffs’ attorney) (“If you want to make changes to the rules to reduce the costs of 
eDiscovery, add sanctions for failure to cooperate.”); id. at 55–56 (statement of Henry Kelston) (“There 
is nothing in the amendments that requires or even incentivizes conduct that would reduce the overall 
cost of discovery.  The concept of cooperation may get a brief nod in the notes to Rule 1, but no one 
really expects that to change conduct on the ground.”). 
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result in delay”—terms that are not further elaborated.   
The pending Committee Note also links “proportional,” one of the 
other watchwords of the day, to “cooperation,” and admonishes lawyers 
that both are necessary for “effective advocacy.”  That is debatable.  
Professor Paul Carrington, who was the Reporter for the Advisory 
Committee under Chief Justice Warren Burger, objected to the notion 
“that lawyers are supposed to be not too vigorous on behalf of their 
clients if it would somehow be a pain to the other side,”89 and suggested 
that it impinged on the adversary system.90  
 No one disagrees with the basic notion of cooperation – at least, no one 
would publicly disagree with that notion.  So will the seemingly-innocuous 
change to Rule 1 have any practical consequences, good or bad?  Without a 
definition of cooperation or any mechanism to enforce it, the prospect of a 
beneficial effect appears dim.  On the other hand, litigants will probably 
deploy new Rule 1, which is not limited to the discovery rules, in any 
number of unanticipated ways.  For example, is filing a reflexive motion to 
dismiss or motion for summary judgment cooperative?  Is opposing a 
motion to amend a pleading or a motion for extension of time cooperative?  
It seems likely that all these things, and more, will be argued under new 
Rule 1. 
2. Evidence of Cooperation, or the Lack Thereof, Before the 
Advisory Committee 
The discussion on cooperation during the hearings revealed a strange 
disconnect by the Committee between its belief in the necessity of 
reemphasizing cooperation in the notes to Rule 1, and its steadfast 
refusal to acknowledge that any opposing counsel or any federal judge 
would ever be anything but reasonable.  Time and again in response to 
plaintiffs’ suggestions that limiting discovery would hurt their cases, the 
Committee members expressed Panglossian optimism that surely 
opposing counsel—and failing that, the judge—would see reason and 
allow plaintiffs what they needed.91   
 
 89. Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 60. 
 90. Id. at 68–69. 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 179 (in response to a plaintiffs’ lawyer’s statement that the proposed 
reduction to six hours for a deposition would negatively impact her practice because she had to use 
translators, Judge Pratter asked, “Well, if your alternative was to speak to your opponent and say you 
understand that the plaintiff or the witnesses are not English speakers, we’re going to have to bring a 
translator, do you really think that you’re going to run into problems with opposing counsel, who is 
going to say, you know, five hours are five hours?  I mean, really?”); id. at 187 (question of Judge 
Campbell) (“it seems to me that a limit of five depositions is a disaster only if you can’t get more when 
you need more, and to say that a presumptive limit is a disaster necessarily implies that judges won’t 
exceed it in cases where it should be exceeded.”); Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the 
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But illustrations of uncooperative behavior by defendants’ counsel 
abounded.92  Witnesses called defendants’ initial disclosures “worthless” 
and asserted that defendants “dumped” millions of documents on them 
in response to more narrowly tailored requests.93  Several lawyers 
mentioned that defendants’ counsel responded to most discovery 
requests with “boilerplate objections,”94 which one particularly candid 
defense lawyer conceded using.95  Another witness cited a case in which 
the judge denied KPMG’s motion for a protective order due to KPMG’s 
“refusal to cooperate” with the plaintiffs and the magistrate judge in 
negotiating the scope of preservation of ESI.96  While not mentioned at 
the hearings before the Committee, a Jones Day lawyer was recently 
sanctioned in Iowa for obstreperous conduct at depositions.97     
Two attorneys at the defense firm of Thompson & Knight in Texas, 
testifying in favor of the pending amendments, asserted that they 
cooperated in discovery.98  But at least one publicly available order 
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Before the Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 113th 
Cong. 161 (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-
committees (download Civil Rules Public Hearing Transcript, Dallas, TX)  [hereinafter Feb. 2014 
Hearing] (in response to plaintiffs’ counsel’s assertion that the proposed move of “proportionality” to 
26(b)(1) will cause a defendant to simply object on that ground, Mr. Barkett responded, “So the 
assumption in your conclusion is that a judge would allow you to get away with that?”); Feb. 2014 
Hearing, at 306 (in response to plaintiffs’ counsel’s statement that it was a “fight” to get defendants’ 
“policies and procedures” in discovery, Judge Koeltl responded that “presumably the policies and 
procedures are reduced to a manual, you know, the simplified situation, that would be easy for you to 
get.”). 
 92. Of course, defense counsel also complained of uncooperative behavior by plaintiffs.  Peter 
Strand, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP—the same firm as Committee member John Barkett—stated: 
Last week I received a 30(b)(6) notice in a competitor-on-competitor case seeking right off the 
bat ESI discovery.  We want a 30(b)(6) day-long deposition regarding your ESI processes.  Now 
how does that have anything to do with a patent infringement case?  Take your patent, take my 
product, look at it, and we either infringe or we don’t.  But no, we’re going to spend $100,000 
fighting about ESI discovery right off the bat. 
Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 121–22.  It was not made clear how a day-long deposition could 
cost a client $100,000.00.   
 93. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 86 (statement of Michael Weston). 
 94. Id. at 106 (statement of Mark Chalos); id. at 301 (statement of Rotkis) (“Every single 
interrogatory, request for production comes back to me with a boilerplate objection, a general objection, 
I have a meet and confer, they never have any authority. This drags the process out.”). 
 95. Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 40. 
 96. Id. at 230–31 (citing Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
 97. See generally Security Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Abbott Laboratories, 299 F.R.D. (N.D. 
Iowa 2014).  Jones Day is the former law firm of Advisory Committee member Professor Robert 
Klonoff and Standing Committee chair Judge Jeffrey Sutton. 
 98. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 175 (testimony of John Martin) (“I think all of us 
would prefer to resolve discovery disputes beforehand [before involving the judge].”); id. at 341–42 
(testimony of Jennifer Knight) (“If they want to take more, then stipulations of the parties, the 
agreement, or they still may seek leave of the Court.  Which again, in my experience, any time I have 
had a case where we needed more than the ten [depositions] that are currently allowed, we have been 
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involving those attorneys does not reveal such a cooperative spirit.  
Thompson & Knight once refused to make sixty-five boxes of 
documents available to its opponent for more than the two days to which 
its opponent had earlier agreed.  When the opponent (who traveled to 
Los Angeles to review the documents) was unable to complete the 
review in two days, Thompson & Knight apparently refused to extend 
the two-day period, prompting the opponent to file a motion to compel.  
The magistrate ordered Thompson & Knight to produce the documents 
again.99  Admittedly without knowing the whole story, one could 
reasonably conclude that failing to allow out-of-town counsel a third day 
of document review does not sound terribly cooperative. 
None of the members of the Advisory Committee challenged defense 
witnesses who claimed to be cooperative in discovery, even though 
plaintiff-oriented speakers claimed, “Discovery costs are driven by the 
costs of avoiding discovery, not the cost of making discovery.”100  
Committee members were quick to credit defense assertions that 
discovery “abuse” by plaintiffs forced defendants into extortionate 
settlements,101 but never asked defendants’ lawyers whether defense 
obstruction of discovery prevented meritorious claims from going 
forward or resulted in unfairly low settlements to plaintiffs.102 
Ford Motor Company provided a particularly good example of a 
defense witness practically crying out for a cross-examination (or even 
mildly skeptical questioning) that never came.  Ford’s publicly-filed 
comments complained that plaintiffs “commonly used [discovery] 
against Ford in ways that are not just, fair, or efficient . . .”103  Later, at 
 
able to reach agreement.”). 
 99. Malibu Consulting Corp. v. Funair Corp., No. SA-06-CA-0735, 2007 WL 3996302, at *2 
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2007).  Inexplicably, the magistrate “denied” the motion to compel, although she 
ordered that the documents be produced again.  It appears that discovery in the case was quite 
contentious; Thompson & Knight had earlier won its own motion to compel.  See Malibu Consulting 
Corp. v. Funair Corp., No. SA-06-CA-0735, 2007 WL 2787982 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2007). 
 100. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 265 (remarks of Stuart A. Ollanik).  
 101. See Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 21 (Judge Campbell questioning plaintiffs’ 
employment lawyer Joseph Garrison). 
 102. See, e.g., How Corporations Abuse Our Civil Justice System, CENTER FOR JUSTICE & 
DEMOCRACY, http://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-discovery-abuse-how-corporations-abuse-our-civil-
justice-system (last visited May 13, 2015) (citing numerous cases in which corporations were sanctioned 
for discovery abuse; for example, “between 1998 and 2000 there were 52 sanctions against [Wal-Mart], 
whose behavior courts have characterized as ‘corrupt’ and ‘nefarious’”); David Halperin, Discovery 
Abuse: How Defendants in Products Liability Lawsuits Hide and Destroy Evidence, PUBLIC CITIZEN 
(July 1997), http://www.citizen.org/congress/article_redirect.cfm?ID=918; Green v. Blitz, U.S.A., Inc., 
No. 2:07-cv-372 (TJW) LEXIS 20353 (E.D. Tex., Mar. 1, 2011) (Shook, Hardy & Bacon, the law firm 
of Advisory Committee member John Barkett, was one of several law firms for defendant in case 
sanctioning defendant for destroying documents), order vacated pursuant to settlement, Green v. Blitz 
U.S.A., Inc., 2014 WL 2591344 (E.D. Tex., Jun. 10, 2014). 
103.  Doug Lampe, Ford Motor Company Comment to Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil 
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the February 2014 hearing, Ford’s assistant general counsel Donald 
Lough asserted: 
We . . . expend disproportionate resources opposing discovery 
motions that seek to keep us from juries through sanctions that limit 
evidence, that strike witnesses, and even strike pleadings in some 
cases. 




The Committee members had no questions for Mr. Lough.105  Perhaps 
they were chilled from commenting by the fact that Shook, Hardy & 
Bacon, the law firm of Committee member John Barkett, frequently 
represents Ford Motor Company.106 
Setting aside Mr. Lough’s fictional notion that Ford is fighting to get 
before a jury, many others have described Ford’s behavior in discovery 
far less charitably.  For example, one publicly-filed comment disputed 
Ford’s representation of sterling behavior in discovery, documenting 
numerous instances of Ford being sanctioned for discovery abuse.107  
And this commenter’s list named only a fraction of the courts that have 
sanctioned or chastised Ford for discovery abuse over the years.108   
 
Rules (Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-
2013-0002-0343 (“Discovery in Ford’s cases has been commonly used against Ford in ways that are not 
just, fair, or efficient to the resolution of disputes but instead to gain tactical or settlement leverage, for 
discovery-on-discovery, or for satellite litigation.”).   
 104. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 250. 
 105. Id. at 254. 
 106. E.g., Sansoe v. Ford Motor Co., No. C 13-5043 PJH, 2014 LEXIS 74052 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 
2014); Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 433 Md. 137, 70 A.3d 328 (Md. Ct. App. 2013); Childress v. Ford 
Motor Co., No. 04-5020-CV-SW-RED, 2005 WL 5989804 (W.D. Mo. June 20, 2005); Bro v. Ford 
Motor Co., 04-0638-CV-W-HFS, 2005 WL 3190334 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 29, 2005).  Victor E. Schwartz, 
one of the architects of “tort reform” and General Counsel for the American Tort Reform Association, is 
a partner at Shook Hardy & Bacon. Victor E. Schwartz, SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, 
http://www.shb.com/attorney_detail.aspx?id=16 (last visited May 12, 2015).  
107. Larry E. Coben, The Attorneys Information Exchange Group, Comments Concerning the 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Jan. 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0384 (citing eight cases 
from around the country from 1998 to 2012 in which courts had found that Ford abused discovery).   
 108. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tennin, 960 So.2d 379, 398 (Miss. 2007) (Diaz, J. dissenting) 
(stating that “Ford has become notorious for its foot-dragging and sandbagging during discovery, and it 
has an extensive history of abusing the discovery process,” citing eight other cases as examples); 
Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., No. 4:03CV074, 2006 WL 910012, at *10 (W.D. Va. April 7, 2006) 
(recommending sanctions against Ford and stating, “[t]he plaintiff in this case has been required time 
and again to move the court to require Ford to comply with its discovery obligations under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and twice has uncovered documents outside of this case bearing on the issues 
in this case of which Ford was aware, yet chose not to produce.”); Wiitala v. Ford Motor Co., No. 
214444, 2001 WL 1179610 (Mich. App. Oct. 5, 2001) (affirming award of discovery sanctions against 
Ford). 
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Getting back to the overall issue of cooperation, a plaintiffs’ lawyer 
testified, “There are genuine cooperators, there are pretend cooperators 
and then there are parties that don’t even pretend to cooperate.”109  
Without any mechanism to enforce an undefined notion of 
“cooperation,” it seems doubtful that the change to Rule 1 will 
incentivize the “pretend cooperators” and those “that don’t even pretend 
to cooperate” to change.  As the Committee itself recognized, there is a 
limit to what rules can accomplish.110  And even the rules that currently 
allow for sanctions are only rarely enforced.111 
C. Pending Amendments That Disadvantage Plaintiffs and 
Advantage Defendants 
1. Rule 4(m): Time to Serve Process 
The pending change to Rule 4(m) is: 
(m) Time Limit for Service.  If a defendant is not served within 120 
90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its 
own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without 
prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a 
specified time.  But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, 
the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.  
This subdivision (m) does not apply to service in a foreign country 
under Rule 4(f) or 4(j)(1) or to service of a notice under Rule 
71.1(d)(3)(A). 
The current 120-day allowance has been in the rules since 1983, when 
it was added to account for the transfer of responsibility for serving 
process from the U.S. Marshal to the plaintiff.112  The Committee 
originally proposed a reduction of the time from 120 days to sixty days, 
but after public comment, it split the difference at ninety days.  It found 
“particularly persuasive” the comment that the proposed reduction to 
sixty days would eliminate, as a practical matter, the plaintiff’s option to 
request waiver of service under Rule 4(d).113  In addition, public 
 
 109. Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 61 (testimony of Henry Kelston of Milberg LLP).  
110.  REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 5 (“‘what we’re seeing is the limits of 
rules’”). 
 111. See, e.g., Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule 37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”: More Bark Than Bite, 
42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 122–26 (2011). 
 112. See Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. 97–462, Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2527 (amending the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 113. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 15.  This is because plaintiff must allow 
defendant thirty days—sixty if defendant is outside the US—to return the waiver of service.  If 
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comments offered many “reasons why 60 days is not enough time to 
serve process,” including an evasive defendant, a multitude of 
defendants, or a pro se plaintiff.114   
It is unclear who first generated the idea of reducing the time to serve 
process.  It was not the focus of any of the panelists at the Duke 
Conference,115 nor did the Advisory Committee mention reducing the 
time to serve process in either its report to the Chief Justice or to the 
Standing Committee about the Duke Conference.116   
The only justification asserted for the reduction in time to serve 
process was that it “will reduce delay at the beginning of litigation.”117  
But neither plaintiffs nor defendants complained about delay at the 
beginning of litigation: plaintiffs complained about delay caused by 
motion practice118 and obstructive tactics in discovery, and defendants 
complained about delay caused by overuse of discovery and excessive 
burdens in preserving electronically stored information.119  And there is 
one source of delay both sides agreed upon: there was “wide frustration 
in overall delays by judges in ruling on motions.”120       
The written comments on the proposed amendment to Rule 4(m) were 
7–1 against the proposal.121  Even a representative of the Illinois 
 
defendant has not waived service at the end of that period, plaintiff must formally serve process.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(F). 
 114. Id. 
 115. REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 13–16.  
 116. Id. at 1–12; May 2010 Advisory Comm. Rep, supra note 37, at 7–17. 
 117. Id. at 17. 
 118. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 106 (“In practice we see in our cases right out of the 
gate a 12(b)(6) motion in almost every case challenging under Iqbal and Twombly. . . . We see motions 
for summary judgment, motions to strike class allegations, Daubert motions, renewed motions for 
summary judgment, motions to decertify class actions.”).  See also Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 
161 (testimony of Kathryn Dickson) (“The single worst development has been Rule 56 and the 
interpretation of Rule 56.  That’s the 800-pound gorilla in this room, and that’s what’s driving cost.  The 
first 15 years of my practice I never had a summary judgment motion filed because I choose my cases 
carefully and develop them well.  Then in the ‘90s, they started coming and in the last ten years, in 
every single employment case I have, there’s a summary judgment motion.  That’s where the cost is.”); 
Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 19 (testimony of Don Slavik) (“[O]ver 30 plus years I have seen a 
decline in jury trials, and I know why.  It’s because of the motion practice and the expense.  We have 
put in Daubert, as well as a whole other layer of expense and time.  We added Twombly and Iqbal, 
another layer of expense and time.  Please don’t add another layer of expense and time by putting in 
these rules which will lead to further litigation and motion practice.”). 
119. See, e.g., Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 125 (testimony of Dan Troy, senior vice 
president and general counsel for GlaxoSmithKline).  
 120. REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 10.  See also Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra 
note 1, at 238 (testimony of Nicholas Woodfield) (“In the last couple of years, . . . I have waited 18 
months for a motion to dismiss ruling, and I have waited three years for a summary judgment decision 
where we had to mandamus the D.C. Circuit to get a decision on the summary judgment”). 
 121. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 9–16 (summarizing about 55 comments 
against the amendment and 8 comments in favor). 
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Association of Defense Trial Counsel opposed the change.122  In 
addition to detailing some of the difficulties encountered in effectuating 
service, commenters also noted that even if the dismissal was without 
prejudice, the plaintiff would incur costs to refile, and predicted an 
increase in motion practice as plaintiffs would need to move for 
extensions more frequently.  
At the public hearings on the proposed amendments, one plaintiff’s 
lawyer opined that Rule 4(m) was not broken and that there was no need 
to fix it: that “it’s always in plaintiff’s interest to get the summons and 
complaints served as soon as possible.”123  Another plaintiff’s lawyer 
stated that in certain cases with a quick statute of limitations (like the 
ninety days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission) or the mandatory involvement 
of the federal government (as in False Claims Act cases), it was 
desirable to file the complaint but wait to serve process until greater 
factual development had occurred.124  This lawyer also did not shy away 
from offering his “suspicion” that the Committee, which is made up 
mostly of federal judges, was proposing the time reduction in Rule 4(m) 
simply to shorten their case disposition times.125  The AO publishes the 
number of cases pending more than three years for each individual judge 
by name.126  As a result, judges have some incentive to reduce their case 
disposition times. 
Besides the obvious effect of cutting the plaintiff’s time to serve 
process by 25%, a second, less-noticed result of the thirty-day reduction 
in time will be to reduce the statute of limitations period on any 
defendant which plaintiff attempts to add in an amended complaint filed 
after the running of the statute of limitations.  Rule 15(c)(1)(C) allows a 
claim against a newly-added defendant to relate back to the date of the 
original complaint (and thus avoid the bar of the statute of limitations) if 
the new defendant received notice of the action “within the period 
provided by Rule 4(m).”127  (It is a bit more complicated than that, but 
that is the gist of it.)   
Thus, for example, assume that plaintiff filed a complaint against 
Defendant A on February 1, the statute of limitations ran on March 1, 
and the plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add a claim against 
new Defendant B on August 1.  The new claim would relate back to 
 
 122. Id. at 14. 
 123. Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 184. 
 124. Id. at 235–38. 
 125. Id. at 238. 
126.  See infra Part III.C.  
 127. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).  For clarity, I have simplified the requirements of the rule here in 
ways that do not affect the underlying analysis. 
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February 1 if Defendant B had received notice of the action by 
approximately June 1 (February 1 plus the 120-day period for service 
currently allowed by Rule 4(m).)  Under the proposed amendment 
reducing the 4(m) period to ninety days, plaintiff will only be able to 
avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if Defendant B received notice 
of the action by approximately May 1 (February 1 plus ninety days).   
The Committee briefly noted the relationship between Rule 4(m) and 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C), stating cryptically that “[t]his relationship has in fact 
been considered throughout the development of this proposal.”128  
However, it failed to explain the rationale for this windfall to 
defendants.129   
What of the possibility, stated in Rule 4(m), of obtaining an extension 
of the time to serve process?  It turns out that courts frequently deny 
plaintiffs’ requests for such time extensions.130  The denials are common 
even when the running of the statute of limitations means that a 
dismissal purportedly “without prejudice” actually operates as a 
dismissal with prejudice.131  This result occurs despite a 1993 Advisory 
Committee Note to the contrary that “[r]elief [for a time extension] may 
be justified, for example, if the applicable statute of limitations would 
bar the refiled action . . . ”132 
The Advisory Committee Note to the pending amendment to Rule 
4(m) in the transmission to the Supreme Court stated: 
Shortening the presumptive time for service will increase the 
frequency of occasions to extend the time for good cause.  More time 
may be needed, for example, when a request to waive service fails, a 
defendant is difficult to serve, or a marshal is to make service in an in 
 
 128. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 15. 
 129. See id., at 18 (the Committee’s entire comment on this is that “[s]hortening the time to serve 
under Rule 4(m) means that the time of the notice required by Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for relation back is also 
shortened.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Eric C. Surette, Recognition and Application of Court’s Discretion, Absent 
Showing of Good Cause, to Extend Time for, or Excuse Late, Service of Process Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(m), 54 A.L.R. FED. 2D 255 (originally published 2011) (citing numerous cases denying plaintiff’s 
motion for an extension of time to serve process beyond 120 days); Richard J. Link, Efforts of Plaintiff 
or Plaintiff’s Agent for Service of Process as Constituting or Supporting Finding of “Good Cause,” 
Under Rule 4(j) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for Failure to Timely Serve Process upon 
Defendant, 111 A.L.R. FED. 503 (originally published 1993) (same); Richard J. Link, Conduct of 
Defendant or Defendant’s Attorney, Other than Express Waiver of Service of Process, that Induces 
Plaintiff to Forgo Service of Process as Constituting or Supporting Finding of “Good Cause,” Under 
Rule 4(j) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for Plaintiff’s Failure to Timely Serve Process, 108 
A.L.R. FED. 887 (originally published 1992) (same).  Current Rule 4(m) was previously numbered 4(j).   
 131. E.g., Bills v. Shelby County Gov’t, No. 13–2853–STA–cgc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79385 
(W.D. Tenn. June 11, 2014).   
 132. FED. R. CIV. P. 4, advisory comm. notes to 1993 amendments. 
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forma pauperis action.
133
   
The Supreme Court requested the Committee to remove the words 
“for good cause” in the first sentence, and this has been done.134  The 
public record does not reveal the Court’s reason, but it may be in tacit 
recognition that the first sentence of Rule 4(m) appears to allow a court 
to order an extension of time to serve even without good cause.135  
Notably, even after this change, the Committee Note still does not 
include the running of the statute of limitations as a reason, good or 
otherwise, for an extension.  Based on the large number of reported 
cases in which courts denied plaintiff’s request for an extension, the 
Committee’s apparent optimism that courts will grant more extensions 
in the future does not appear well-founded.  The actual standard for 
granting an extension as stated in the text of the rule will not change, 
and courts are not bound by a Committee note.   
2. Rule 26(b)—Narrowing (Once Again) the Scope of Discovery 
The pending limitations of the scope of discovery supposedly follow 
the third theme of the Duke Conference: “proportionality.”  However, 
the Advisory Committee’s contemporaneous reports of the Duke 
Conference stated plainly that “there was no demand at the Conference 
for a change to the [26(b)(1)] rule language [on scope]; there is no clear 
case for present reform.”136  Despite the Duke Conference’s lack of 
mandate to change the scope of discovery, the pending amendments will 
do just that by overhauling Rule 26(b) in four ways:137 
 
 133. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 17–18. 
134.  Duff Memorandum, supra note 2. 
135.  Inveterate Court watchers may wonder if the Court’s request to change the Committee Note 
signals how it would have ruled in Chen v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, Maryland, No. 13-
10400, in which the Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits as to “[w]hether, under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), a district court has discretion to extend the time for service of 
process absent a showing of good cause.”  Order, Nov. 7, 2014.  The writ of certiorari was dismissed 
after the petitioner failed to timely file a brief on the merits.  Order, Jan. 9, 2015.  See SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/chen-v-mayor-and-city-council-of-baltimore-maryland/.  
 136. REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 8.  In addition, the first report to the 
Standing Committee about the Duke Conference simply stated, without further elaboration, “Bolder 
suggestions ask for some narrowing in the scope of discovery as described in amended Rule 26(b)(1).  
These suggestions rely in part on the view that the 2000 distinction between ‘claims or defenses’ 
discovery and ‘subject-matter’ discovery has not had any noticeable effect in controlling discovery.”  
May 2010 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 37, at 14. 
 137. The pending amendment to 26(b) is: 
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. 
(1)  Scope in General.  Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as 
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of 
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 They will make so-called “proportionality” an element defining 
the general scope of discovery, rather than a court-imposed 
limitation on discovery that is otherwise within the general 
scope. 
 They eliminate the court’s ability to broaden the general scope 
of discovery to “any matter relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the action.” 
 They delete as “clutter” a statement, which has been in 26(b) 
since 1946,138 that the scope of permissible inquiry includes 
information about the existence and location of documents and 
the identity of witnesses; and 
 They rephrase, as misunderstood, another phrase that has been 
in Rule 26(b) since 1946: that relevant information sought in 
discovery does not need to be admissible in evidence if it 
“appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.” 
The source of the changes to Rule 26(b)(1) can be traced not to 
consensus at the Duke Conference, but to a “white paper” released by 
leading defense-oriented organizations a week before the Duke 
Conference.  The defense groups proposed an amendment to Rule 
 
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. 
Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be 
discoverable. — including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of 
any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any 
discoverable matter.  For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the action.  Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if 
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  All 
discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C). 
(2)  Limitations on Frequency and Extent. 
* * * 
(C) When Required.  On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of 
discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that: * * * 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by 
Rule 26(b)(1) outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount 
in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 
 138. In 1946, Rule 26(b) addressed only the scope of depositions, and provided: “26(b) Scope of 
Examination.  Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may 
be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or 
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location 
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of relevant facts.  It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the 
trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.” 5 F.R.D. 433, 453; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 503 (1947). 
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26(b)(1) that provided in its entirety: “Scope in General. The scope of 
discovery is limited to any nonprivileged matter that would support 
proof of a claim or defense and must comport with the proportionality 
assessment required by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”139  The defense groups’ pre-
Duke proposal is very similar to the version now pending before 
Congress: it moved proportionality into the scope of discovery, and it 
eliminated “subject matter” discovery, the “reasonably calculated” 
language, and the “existence and location of documents” language. 
As might be expected, given its birth in the organized defense bar, the 
proposed contraction of discovery under Rule 26(b) incited the most 
passionate public opposition.  Plaintiff’s lawyers almost unanimously 
opposed, and defendant’s lawyers almost unanimously favored, the 
changes.140  The reason for the split is obvious: plaintiffs need discovery 
far more than defendants.  Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at trial, and 
they usually have less access to the relevant information than 
defendants.  The combined effect of these four changes, just as the 
defense organizations intended, will be to significantly limit discovery.   
a. Proportionality and the “Burden” Issue 
The Advisory Committee has repeatedly asserted that the courts and 
parties have not sufficiently applied the “proportionality” concept as it is 
 
139.  LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DRI – THE VOICE OF THE DEFENSE BAR, FEDERATION OF 
DEFENSE & CORPORATE COUNSEL, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL, RESHAPING 
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEED FOR CLEAR, CONCISE, AND 
MEANINGFUL AMENDMENTS TO KEY RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/lawyers-civil-justice-et-al-reshaping-civil-rules-2010.  
140.  In addition, virtually all of the US law professors who teach Civil Procedure opposed these 
changes.  The Committee ignored all academic input.  See LETTER OF 171 LAW PROFESSORS URGING 
REJECTION OF CHANGING FEDERAL RULES TO LIMIT DISCOVERY AND ELIMINATE FORMS (2014), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2078; 
BETH THORNBURG, COMMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0499; HELEN 
HIRSHKOFF ET AL., COMMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0622; SUZETTE M. 
MALVEAUX, COMMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-1650; PATRICIA W. 
MOORE, COMMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-
RULES-CV-2013-0002-0491.  STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, COMMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0342; PAUL 
CARRINGTON, COMMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0366.  
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currently located in subsection 26(b)(2)(C).141  This assertion appears to 
be based upon anecdotal impressions rather than a review of case law.142  
If anything, the FJC’s closed-case study prepared for the Duke 
Conference143 indicates that lawyers have internalized the concept of 
proportionality in discovery.  They were asked, “On a scale of 1 to 7, 
with 1 being too little, 4 being just the right amount, and 7 being too 
much, how much information did the disclosure and discovery generated 
by the parties in the named case yield?”  Only 11% of defendants’ 
attorneys and 7% of plaintiffs’ attorneys said that discovery had yielded 
“too much” information.  About 89% of defendants’ attorneys and 93% 
of plaintiffs’ attorneys said that “just the right amount” of information or 
even “too little” information had been discovered in the closed case.144  
The FJC also found that the ratio of discovery costs in the case to the 
attorneys’ estimate of their clients’ stakes in the case was surprisingly 
small: “in half of cases with some reported discovery, plaintiff attorneys 
reported that their clients’ discovery costs represented no more than 
1.6% of the clients’ stakes in the case, and defendant attorneys reported 
that their clients’ discovery costs represented no more than 3.3% of their 
clients’ stakes.”145   
The FJC’s findings cannot reasonably be interpreted as an overall 
failure of lawyers and judges to apply proportionality.  About 90% of all 
attorneys surveyed—not just plaintiffs’ attorneys—believed that 
discovery had yielded “just the right amount” or even “too little” 
 
 141. See, e.g., May 2013 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 5, at 10 (“Although the rule now 
directs that the court ‘must’ limit discovery, on its own and without motion, it cannot be said to have 
realized the hopes of its authors. . . . The problem is not with the rule text but with its implementation—
it is not invoked often enough to dampen excessive discovery demands”); May 2011 Advisory Comm. 
Rep., supra note 57, at 60 (“all too often courts address discovery disputes without seeming to mention 
proportionality”). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1193–95 (10th Cir. 2009); Hake v. 
Carroll Cnty, No. WDQ-13-1312, 2014 WL 3974173, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2014) (“the Federal Rules 
require that ‘all permissible discovery must be measured against the yardstick of proportionality.’”); 
Quintana v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-00368-PSG, 2014 WL 234219 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 21, 
2014); Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railroad, No. 2:11-cv-1588, 2013 
WL 6628624 (W.D. Pa., Dec. 17, 2013); Raza v. City of New York, 998 F. Supp. 2d 70 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 
22, 2013); Ewald v. Royal Norwegian Embassy, No. 11-CV-2166, 2013 WL 6094600, at *7 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 20, 2013); Fisher v. Fisher, No. WDQ-11-1038, 2012 WL 2050785, at *7 (D. Md. June 5, 2012) 
(“In light of the cost-benefit balancing factors stated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C), which direct the Court 
to “limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed” if, inter alia, “the discovery sought . . . 
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” 
the parties are directed as follows . . .”); Swanson v. ALZA Corp., No. 12-04579-PJH(KAW), 2013 WL 
5538908, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2013) (“The Northern District Guidelines advocate for the 
proportionality set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).”). 
 143. See generally FJC CASE-BASED REPORT, supra note 16. 
 144. Id. at 27. 
 145. Id. at 47. 
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information.  And the average attorney obtained that information at a 
cost that was dwarfed by the stakes in the litigation. 
During the public hearings on the proposed amendments, the 
Advisory Committee quibbled endlessly with plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
opined that the proposed move of “proportionality” from 26(b)(2)(C) up 
to 26(b)(1) changed the scope of discovery and shifted the burden of 
proving proportionality from the producing party to the requesting 
party.146  In their statements, the Committee members stubbornly 
ignored and denied, as a simple matter of statutory construction, the 
different functions of 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2).  The title of Rule 26(b) 
overall is “Discovery Scope and Limits.”  The title of subsection 
26(b)(1) is “Scope in General.”  The title of subsection 26(b)(2) is 
“Limitations on Frequency and Extent.”   
In other words, subsection 26(b)(1) currently has two elements 
defining the party-initiated “scope in general”: the requested information 
must be, first, nonprivileged and second, relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense.  Subsection 26(b)(2) currently allows the court, on motion of 
the producing party or sua sponte, to limit “discovery otherwise allowed 
by these rules” (i.e., nonprivileged and relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense) if the discovery is not proportional in accordance with the 
factors of subsection (b)(2)(C)(iii).   
The draft of Committee notes that accompanied the proposed 
amendments for publication in May 2013 clearly recognized this 
elementary statutory construction: “The scope of discovery is changed 
in several ways.  Rule 26(b)(1) is revised to limit the scope of discovery 
to what is proportional to the needs of the case.”147  Later Committee 
notes fudged this sentence.148  
The pending amendment to 26(b)(1) will add a third element defining 
the party-initiated scope of discovery: now, the requested information 
will need to be, first, nonprivileged, second, relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense, and third, “proportional to the needs of the case.”  
Neither the producing party nor the court will need to bring up 
proportionality to limit otherwise nonprivileged, relevant discovery.  It 
is crystal clear that proportionality will limit, for the first time, the 
defined scope of discovery “in general.”   
The Committee’s unflinching answer to those who noticed the 
obvious effect of this change was to deny its importance.149  Committee 
 
 146. See, e.g., Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 33, 208, 252, 272. 
147.  May 2013 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 5, at 22. 
148.  See, e.g., May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 21 (“Most of what now appears in 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) was first adopted in 1983.  The 1983 provision was explicitly adopted as part of the 
scope of discovery defined by Rule 26(b)(1).”). 
 149. See, e.g., Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 266–67, Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 
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members asserted that current Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) already requires the 
requesting party to certify that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry: . . . (iii) [it is] 
neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering 
the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in 
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.”  
But Rule 26(g) does not define the “scope in general” of discovery; that 
function is fulfilled by 26(b)(1).  Moreover, the requesting party’s 26(g) 
certification contains the express qualification that the request is not 
disproportional “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry.”  And in order for the court to 
impose sanctions on the requesting party, the certification must have 
been violated “without substantial justification.”150  Those sanctions 
may only be incurred upon motion or sua sponte by the court.151  These 
are significant limitations.  
The Committee also insists that putting proportionality into 26(b)(1) 
simply “restores” the place it occupied in the 1983 version.152  But one 
suspects that the Committee’s ability to analyze statutes is better than 
that.  The 1983 version provided: 
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.  Unless otherwise limited by order 
of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is 
as follows:  
(1) In General.  Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party . . . .  
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: . . . 
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations 
on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after 
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
153
 
The proportionality factors in the second paragraph of the 1983 
version of 26(b)(1) were not part of the first paragraph’s scope of 
 
24, 29, 48, 62–63, 155; Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 52. 
 150. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
151.  Id. 
 152. “The present amendment restores the proportionality factors to their original place in 
defining the scope of discovery.”  May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 23 (emphasis 
added).   
 153. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory comm. notes to 1983 amendments (emphasis added).   
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discovery “in general.”  Rather, the court on motion or sua sponte could 
“limit” the “frequency or extent of the use of the discovery methods” if 
the discovery sought was not proportional.  The Advisory Committee’s 
note to the 1983 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), which added the 
proportionality concepts, made this clear: 
Rule 26(b)(1) has been amended to add a sentence to deal with the 
problem of over-discovery.  The objective is to guard against 
redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority 
to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that 
are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.  The new sentence is 
intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and 
discouraging discovery overuse.  The grounds mentioned in the 
amended rule for limiting discovery reflect the existing practice of 
many courts in issuing protective orders under Rule 26(c).
154
 
Proportionality has never defined the general scope of discovery, and 
the statement that the amendments will simply “restore” proportionality 
to its former place is disingenuous. 
The effect of including proportionality into the initial scope of 
discovery will likely be to place the burden on the party moving to 
compel to show that its discovery request was proportional.  As an 
analogy, the current case law places the burden to show “relevance” 
under Rule 26(b)(1) on the requesting party, and if that burden is met, 
then the opposing party has the burden to show that “the burden and 
expense of the discovery sought outweighs its likely benefit” under 
26(b)(2)(iii).155  
 Plaintiffs’ lawyers repeatedly asserted during the public hearings that 
the natural reading of moving proportionality was to change the burden 
of proof on a motion to compel.  The Advisory Committee later 
attempted to mollify plaintiffs’ lawyers by adding the following pending 
committee note:  
Restoring [sic] the proportionality calculation to 26(b)(1) does not 
change the existing responsibilities of the court and the parties to 
consider proportionality, and the change does not place on the party 




This comment does nothing to help the party seeking discovery.  It 
repeats the inaccurate implication that the proportionality element has 
 
 154. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, advisory comm. notes to 1983 amendments (emphasis added). 
 155. E.g., Sills v. Bendix Commercial Vehicle Sys., LLC, No. 1:04-CV-00149, 2005 LEXIS 3392 
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2005) (granting plaintiff’s motion to compel). 
 156. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 23 (emphasis added). 
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merely been “restored” to the scope of discovery.  And by negative 
implication, it places on the party seeking discovery the burden of 
addressing some—though not “all”—of the proportionality 
considerations.  More generally, it is puzzling why the Committee thinks 
putting an “explanation” in the Advisory Committee Notes will carry the 
day when key language (all of which dates back to 1983) has been 
deleted from, changed, or moved in the text.157  
b. The Demise of “Relevant to the Subject Matter Involved in the 
Action” 
The Advisory Committee Note that was initially proposed for 
publication in 2013 did not shed much light on the reason for 
eliminating court-ordered discovery of matters relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action.  The Note stated only: 
The proposed amendment deletes the “subject matter involved in the 
action” from the scope of discovery.  Discovery should be limited to 
the parties’ claims or defenses.  If discovery of information relevant to 
the claims or defenses identified in the pleadings shows support for 
new claims or defenses, amendment of the pleadings may be allowed 
when appropriate. 
The newly-revised Committee Note, released in 2014 after the public 
hearings and comments, says a bit more: 
The amendment deletes the former provision authorizing the court, for 
good cause, to order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action.  The Committee has been informed that 
this language is rarely invoked.  Proportional discovery relevant to 
any party’s claim or defense suffices, given a proper understanding of 
what is relevant to a claim or defense.
158
   
 
157.  Justice Scalia, the textualist hero of the Federalist Society (with which many of the 
Committee members are associated), has repeatedly declined to rely on Advisory Committee Notes for 
interpretation of a federal rule.  E.g., Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2010) (Scalia, J. 
concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion with two exceptions.  First, I do not join in its reliance on the 
Notes of the Advisory Committee in determining the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
30(d). The Committee’s view is not authoritative.”); Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 
557 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion except for its reliance on the Notes of the 
Advisory Committee as establishing the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C).  The 
Advisory Committee’s insights into the proper interpretation of a Rule’s text are useful to the same 
extent as any scholarly commentary.  But the Committee’s intentions have no effect on the Rule’s 
meaning.  Even assuming that we and the Congress that allowed the Rule to take effect read and agreed 
with those intentions, it is the text of the Rule that controls.”). 
158.  The note continues at length without ever explaining the need for this particular change.  See 
May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 24–25. 
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The Committee does not identify who “informed” it that “this 
language is rarely invoked,” but an examination of case law contradicts 
this assertion.  Even after the 2000 amendment that introduced the 
distinction between “relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses” and 
“relevant to the subject matter,” courts have routinely granted motions 
to compel based on the “relevant to the subject matter” language.159  
Moreover, even if a court does not specifically rely on the “relevant to 
the subject matter” language in granting a motion to compel, courts 
almost always explicitly recognize the current difference between 
“party-initiated discovery,” which must be relevant to the parties’ claims 
and defenses, and “court-ordered discovery,” which for “good cause” 
can extend all the way to “the subject matter involved in the action.”160  
The fact that the “subject matter” provision is currently in the rule 
signals that, however one defines it, there is something that is broader 
than relevance to the claims or defenses, and the court can order it 
discovered for good cause.  In other words, the deletion removes the 
anchoring effect of a possibility of discovery broader than relevance to 
the parties’ claims or defenses.161  
 
 159. E.g., Freres v. Xyngular Corp., 2:13-cv-400-DAK-PMW, 2014 WL 4249974, at *5 (D. Utah 
Aug. 27, 2014) (“Plaintiff takes a very narrow view of what type of information is relevant in this 
lawsuit. The court rejected Plaintiff’s narrow stance on discovery in the two orders ruling on those 
motions, and the court rejects it again here. The court has determined that good cause exists to allow the 
deposition of Nerium because the information sought by Defendant through that deposition is, at 
minimum, relevant to the subject matter of this case.”); Bertrang v. Wisconsin Cent., Ltd., No. 14-0133 
(SRN/JJG), 2014 WL 4199710, at *367 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2014) (“Although questions about this topic 
may not be directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claim, the Court may permit discovery of “any matter relevant 
to the subject matter involved in the action,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) . . . [T]he Court is persuaded that the 
topic is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence . . .”); Janis v. Nelson, No. 
CR 09-5019-KES, 2009 WL 5216898, at *5 (D.S.D. Dec. 30, 2009) (“Even if these discovery requests 
seek information beyond plaintiffs’ claims, such information is relevant to the subject matter of this case 
and good cause exists for allowing the discovery. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)”); Humphreys v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., No. C 04-03808 SI, 2006 WL 870963 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2006) (granting plaintiff’s 
motion to compel because she showed that “the information requested is ‘relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the action’” under 26(b)(1)). 
 160. E.g., In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2009) (“This change 
[the 2000 amendment to 26(b)(1)] implemented a two-tiered discovery process; the first tier being 
attorney-managed discovery of information relevant to any claim or defense of a party, and the second 
being court-managed discovery that can include information relevant to the subject matter of the 
action.”). 
 161. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 119–28 (2011) (describing 
psychological phenomenon of “anchoring”). 
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c. Deleting “the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, 
and location of any documents or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable 
matter” 
In a rule that is currently 3,649 words long, the best argument the 
Advisory Committee can come up with to justify deleting these 
particular twenty-eight words is that they “clutter” the rule.  These 
words have been in the rule since 1946.  Apparently after sixty-eight 
years, “[d]iscovery of such matters is so deeply entrenched in practice” 
that spelling it out “is no longer necessary,” according to the Committee. 
As a Civil Procedure teacher for over twenty years, I can virtually 
guarantee that law students and new lawyers will not so easily intuit, 
without those words in the rule, what is so obvious to the Committee.  In 
addition, the Committee’s implication that this deletion will have no 
effect is contrary to basic principles of statutory interpretation, which 
require that courts “construe statutes, where possible, so as to avoid 
rendering superfluous any parts thereof,”162 and that “when Congress 
alters the words of a statute, it must intend to change the statute’s 
meaning.”163  It defies the very nature of lawyers to pretend that deleting 
something from a statute that has been there for sixty-eight years will 
not be interpreted as, or at least argued to be, meaningful. 
The latest Advisory Committee Note attempts to address the concern 
that deletion of this time-honored phrase will invite “ill-founded 
attempts to draw negative inferences from the deletion”:164 
The discovery identified in these examples [for example, 
discovery of the location of documents] should still be permitted 
under the revised rule when relevant and proportional to the needs 
of the case.  Framing intelligent requests for electronically stored 
information, for example, may require detailed information about 
another party’s information systems and other information 
resources.165 
More likely than a “cluttered” rule, the probable explanation for 
deleting this phrase is that it has been revitalized by the rapid growth of 
e-discovery, and large organizations dislike having to explain their 
systems for preserving and locating electronically stored information to 
plaintiffs.  Consequently, in a discovery dispute that is left to the judge’s 
 
 162. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991). 
 163. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 336 (1992).   
164.  May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 9.  
165.  Id. at 24. 
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discretion, any rule-based argument against such a line of inquiry is one 
more salvo.  If this amendment takes effect, counsel for large 
responding institutions may immediately begin to argue that a 30(b)(6) 
deposition going to ESI location and custodians will not be 
“proportional to the needs of the case.” 
d. No More “Reasonably Calculated to Lead to the Discovery of 
Admissible Evidence” 
The Committee alleges that “the ‘reasonably calculated’ phrase has 
continued to create problems” because is “has been used by some, 
incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery.”166  “Preliminary 
research,” claimed the Committee, “has uncovered hundreds if not 
thousands of cases that explore this phrase; many of them seem to show 
that courts also think it defines the scope of discovery.”167 
Perhaps the reason that so many courts and lawyers think the phrase 
defines the scope of discovery is because it illustrates what the scope 
includes.  It appears within a section titled “Scope in General,” and it 
states, “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.”168  The sentence merely explains that if something 
is otherwise within the scope of discovery (currently, if it is relevant and 
nonprivileged), then just because it may be inadmissible in evidence 
does not remove it from the scope of discovery.  Of the “thousands of 
cases that explore this phrase,” the Committee does not identify a single 
one in which the court relied on the “reasonably calculated” language to 
order discovery that was not “relevant to the claims and defenses” of the 
parties.  
Nonetheless, the amended rule still contains the basic concept of the 
discarded sentence.  It has been rephrased: “Information within this 
scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be 
discoverable.”        
3. Rule 26(c): Shifting the Expenses of Production to the 
Requesting Party 
With the proposed amendment to Rule 26(c), the Committee is taking 
another step down the road to perhaps the biggest prize for large 
 
 166. Id. at 25. 
167.  CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, MINUTES 9 (April 11–12, 2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-civil-
procedure-april-2013. 
168.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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institutional defendants: shifting to plaintiffs the defendants’ cost of 
responding to discovery (sometimes called the “requester-pays” rule).  
Currently, the default rule is that each party bears its own costs of 
responding to the other side’s discovery requests.   
The newly proposed rule will add “the allocation of expenses” as a 
provision that a court may include in a protective order.  Make no 
mistake, though: the euphemism “allocation of expenses” means 
“shifting of expenses to the requesting party,” who will normally be the 
plaintiff. 
The pending amendment is: 
26(c)  Protective Orders. 
(1)  In General.  * * * The court may, for good cause, issue an order to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
* * * * * 
(B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of 
expenses, for the disclosure or discovery; . . . 
The accompanying pending Committee Note states: 
Rule 26(c)(1)(B) is amended to include an express recognition of 
protective orders that allocate expenses for disclosure or discovery. 
Authority to enter such orders is included in the present rule, and 
courts already exercise this authority. Explicit recognition will 
forestall the temptation some parties may feel to contest this authority. 
Recognizing the authority does not imply that cost-shifting should 
become a common practice. Courts and parties should continue to 
assume that a responding party ordinarily bears the costs of 
responding. 
The requester-pays idea has been tirelessly promoted for years by the 
Federalist Society and its ally, “Lawyers for Civil Justice,” as well as 
other defense groups.169  The infiltration of the federal rulemaking 
apparatus by the Federalist Society and LCJ is detailed below in Part 
 
 169. See, e.g., Cost Allocation, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, http://www.lfcj.com/cost-
allocation.html (last visited June 16, 2015), where LCJ states: 
LCJ strongly supports amending the FRCP to require each party to pay the cost of the discovery 
it seeks.  This so-called “requester pays” rule would preserve the purpose of discovery—to 
permit parties to access information that will enable fact finders to determine the outcome of 
civil litigation—while aligning well-proven economic incentives with the reality of modern 
litigation. Today’s system undermines the fact-finding purpose in a significant fraction of cases, 
instead providing a mechanism for undue economic pressure that can overwhelm the search for 
truth and force parties to settle claims for reasons other than the merits.  A “requester pays” 
default rule would be a self-executing restraint against runaway discovery requests, placing the 
cost-benefit decision with the party in the best position to limit those costs—the requesting 
party.  
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IV.B.   
It is true that the proposed amendment to Rule 26(c) only states 
explicitly what courts are already doing, based on their implicit power in 
the present rule.  And the Committee, in an attempt to calm plaintiffs’ 
fears, added in the Committee Note a statement that cost-shifting should 
not become the norm.  But I suspect that we have not seen the last of 
this: LCJ will continue its efforts to make cost-shifting the “default 
rule.”         
4. Rules 30, 31, and 33: Subjecting the Number of Permitted 
Depositions and Interrogatories to “Proportionality” 
In the published amendments, the Committee originally proposed to 
halve the allowed number of depositions from ten to five; reduce the 
allowed duration of a deposition from seven hours to six; reduce the 
allowed number of interrogatories from twenty-five to fifteen; and limit 
requests to admit for the first time ever to twenty-five.170  After what the 
Committee called “fierce resistance,”171 it withdrew these reductions in 
presumptive limits.  These were the only proposed amendments that 
were completely abandoned after the public comment period. 
But because “proportionality” will be moved from the “limits” on 
discovery in 26(b)(2) to the “scope” of discovery in 26(b)(1), the 
Committee has snuck a heightened emphasis on proportionality into 
Rules 30, 31, and 33 by cross-referencing the new 26(b)(1).172  For 
example, here is the pending amendment to Rule 30: 
Rule 30. Depositions by Oral Examination 
(a) When a Deposition May Be Taken. * * * 
(2) With Leave. A party must obtain leave of court, and the court 
must grant leave to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and 
(2):  
 
 170. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 43, at 267–69.   
 171. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 12.  The Committee’s early enthusiasm for 
the proposed new numerical limits knew no rational bounds.  It stubbornly refused to acknowledge the 
anchoring effect of the reduction on negotiations and motions to compel.  See Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra 
note 1, at 232–33 (plaintiff’s attorney’s difficulty in negotiating additional depositions); Feb. 2014 
Hearing, supra note 91, at 213 (remarks of Megan Jones) (telling Committee “limits are meaningful.  
They affect negotiations,” and that it was “not the case in practice” that one could easily obtain the 
judge’s permission to exceed the limits).  The Committee’s stated rationale for the reduction in 
depositions from ten to five was that the FJC estimates “that 78% or 79% of [studied] cases had 10 or 
fewer depositions.”  PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 43, at 267.  To recommend a reduction on that 
ground is as illogical as decreeing that because the height of American men at the 85th percentile is 
6’1”, production of ready-made clothing for men over 6’1” should cease, and all such tall men should 
order custom-made clothing, if they wanted their clothing to fit.    
 172. May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 27–28. 
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(A) if the parties have not stipulated to the deposition and: 
(i) the deposition would result in more than 10 depositions 
being taken under this rule or Rule 31 by the plaintiffs, or by 
the defendants, or by the third-party defendants.  
* * * 
(d) Duration; Sanction; Motion to Terminate or Limit. 
(1) Duration.  Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the 
court, a deposition is limited to one day of 7 hours.  The court 
must allow additional time consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2) 
if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, 




With “proportionality” now part of the scope of discovery under 
26(b)(1), the cross-references in Rule 30, 31, and 33 will hand parties 
resisting discovery another argument against increasing the presumptive 
number of depositions and interrogatories. 
5. Rule 37(e): Preservation of ESI 
The current version of Rule 37(e), adopted in 2006, provides a narrow 
safe harbor that prohibits sanctions for the loss of information due to 
“the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system,” 
such as document-destruction policies adopted without regard to 
particular litigation.  The pending amendment to Rule 37(e) omits the 
existing explicit safe harbor and overhauls not only the current rule, but 
the earlier published-for-comment version of the proposal:174  
Rule 37.  Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in 
Discovery; Sanctions 
* * * 
(e) Failure to Preserve Provide Electronically Stored Information.  
Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an 
electronic information system.  If electronically stored information 
that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of 
litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to 
preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional 
 
 173. Id. at 27 (“Rule 30 is amended in parallel with Rules 31 and 33 to reflect the recognition of 
proportionality in Rule 26(b)(1).”). 
174. The version of the proposal to amend Rule 37(e) that was published for comment in August 
2013 was completely different from—and much more favorable to a party requesting discovery than—
the currently pending amendment.  See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 43, at 314–17. 
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discovery, the court: 
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the 
information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure 
the prejudice; or 
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive 
another party of the information’s use in the litigation may: 
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the 
party; 
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information 
was unfavorable to the party; or 
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.
175
 
Notice how many obstacles a party seeking electronically stored 
information (ESI) would have to surmount to obtain sanctions for the 
failure of the responding party to preserve ESI.  First, the court will have 
to find that the duty to preserve was triggered before the information 
was lost.  Second, the court will have to find that the responding party 
failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the ESI.  Third, the court will 
have to find that the lost ESI “cannot be restored or replaced through 
additional discovery.”  By definition, the ESI is lost, so it is unclear to 
me how the seeking party would know with certainty that “additional 
discovery” could restore or replace the missing information.   
At that point, the court will have found that (1) the responding party 
failed to take reasonable steps to preserve (2) irreplaceable ESI (3) after 
a duty to preserve had been triggered.  Still, the court is not required to 
impose any curative measures or sanctions on the responding party 
without additional findings.  The court “may” take one of two paths: 
if it makes the additional finding that the seeking party was 
“prejudiced” from the loss of the ESI, the court may order 
“measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice,”  
OR 
if it makes the additional finding that the responding party “acted 
with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in 
the litigation,” it may order more serious sanctions, such as an 
adverse inference jury instruction or default judgment. 
In the draft of Rule 37(e) that was published for comment in August 
2013, the drafters allowed the court to order both “curative measures” 
and “sanctions.”176  In the draft that was approved, it appears that the 
court may order either curative measures or sanctions.   
 
175.  PENDING AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 81–82. 
176.  PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 43, at 314–15. 
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As to sanctions, Lawyers for Civil Justice, like many others, 
advocated a national and uniform spoliation sanction approach in light 
of the different mens rea requirements adopted by different courts across 
the country, including negligence, gross negligence, and willfulness.177  
A uniform standard would indeed be useful, but a specific “intent to 
deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation” is the 
toughest standard to prove that the Advisory Committee could have 
adopted, and the very standard that LCJ advocated.178  
Note also that new Rule 37(e) does not include a contempt finding in 
its list of potential sanctions.  Thus, there is a textual argument that the 
amendment to Rule 37(e) eliminates the possibility that a party could be 
held in contempt for intentionally disobeying a court order to preserve 
ESI.  New 37(e) encompasses ESI that “should have been preserved,” 
and the Committee Note states that “[t]he duty to preserve may in some 
instances be triggered or clarified by a court order in the case.”179  The 
contempt provision in Rule 37(b)(2) is available if a party “fails to obey 
an order to provide or permit discovery,”180 which arguably does not 
include an order to preserve ESI.  So it could be argued that Rule 37, as 
amended, does not allow a contempt finding even for intentional 
violation of a preservation order.181 
6. Rule 84 and Abrogation of the Forms Following the FRCP 
The pending abrogation of Rule 84 and all thirty-six of the official 
forms following the FRCP182 may be the most far-ranging amendment 
of all: 
 
177.  See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., COMMENT, THE TIME IS NOW: THE URGENT 
NEED FOR DISCOVERY RULE REFORMS 23 (2011), available at  
http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/lcj_comment_the_time_is_now_the_urgent_need_for_e-
discovery_rule_reforms_103111.pdf (“The Second Circuit allows sanctions to be awarded for mere 
negligence, while the Fifth Circuit does not.”). 
178. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: BACKGROUND, 
http://www.lfcj.com/federal-rules-of-civil-procedure.html (“The FRCP should . . . [limit] the imposition 
of spoliation sanctions only to instances where willful conduct was carried out for the purpose of 
depriving another party of the use of the destroyed evidence and the destruction results in actual 
prejudice to another party”). 
179.  May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 49. 
180.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
181.  In contrast, the draft of Rule 37(e) published for comment in August 2013 allowed a court in 
some instances “to impose any sanction listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A),” which includes a contempt finding.  
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 43, at 315.    
 182. Under the pending amendments, the only official forms to be retained in any format would 
be Forms 5 and 6, relating to waiver of service of process.  These forms would now be referred to in 
FRCP 4(d) and, slightly revised, appended to FRCP 4. 
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Rule 84. Forms 
[Abrogated (Apr. __, 2015, eff. Dec. 1, 2015).] 
The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the 
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate. 
APPENDIX OF FORMS 
[Abrogated [(Apr. __, 2015, eff. Dec. 1, 2015).] 
As with many of the proposed amendments, this one seemingly came 
out of nowhere.  It was not the subject of any presentation at the Duke 
Conference, nor was it mentioned to the Chief Justice as having been 
discussed at the Duke Conference.183  The idea of abrogating the official 
forms was not mentioned in any of the voluminous “empirical research” 
produced for the Duke Conference.184   
In fact, the opposite occurred: the development of standard forms as a 
way to streamline civil litigation was repeatedly suggested.185  Indeed, 
the Advisory Committee characterized the forms in 2011 as “venerable, 
familiar, and often useful.”186  
So what happened?  Why did the Committee ultimately advocate 
sweeping away dozens of familiar forms?  Judge Campbell tried to 
explain during the hearings: 
The motivation on the part of the Committee, if I can dare to try to 
characterize what we are all thinking, but I think it’s accurate, is to get 
us out of the forms business.  In part because many of the forms are 
outdated.  We don’t do a good job, and, in fact, it would be very 
difficult to do a good job of keeping them current through the full 
Rules Enabling Act process.  Not all of the rules committees, as you 
know, run their forms through the Enabling Act process.  And our 
thought has been it’s going to be virtually impossible to stay on top of 
that.  We haven’t done a good job.  They are outdated.  Nobody uses 
them.  Let’s just get out of the forms business and leave it to other 
 
 183. See REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37.  
 184. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF 
LITIGATION, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SOME PROPOSALS (2010); FINAL REPORT ON 
THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND 
THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2009). 
 185. REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 10–11 (“These efforts [judicial and legal 
education] will be supported by the development of effective and readily available materials for lawyers, 
litigants, and judges to use in a variety of cases.  Such materials can include pattern interrogatories and 
production requests for specific categories of litigation.”).  See also Dec. 2010 Advisory Comm. Rep., at 
14, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-
rules-civil-procedure-december-2010; May 2011 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 57, at 59 (“A group 
of lawyers who typically represent plaintiffs or defendants has been formed to develop a protocol of 
initial discovery requests that will be accepted without objection.”). 
186.  May 2011 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 57, at 55.  
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entities to propose forms.
187
 
The Advisory Committee wants out of the “forms business,” after 
promulgating forms since the adoption of the FRCP?  In 1946, the 
Committee wrote: 
The . . . forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient to 
withstand attack under the rules under which they are drawn, and that 
the practitioner using them may rely on them to that extent.  The 
circuit courts of appeals generally have upheld the use of the forms as 
promoting desirable simplicity and brevity of statement.
188
 
Just eight years ago, in 2007, the Committee added six brand-new 
official forms (Forms 1 through 6) and stylistically revised all the rest of 
the decades-old forms.  And the bankruptcy rules advisory committee 
proposed numerous new forms at the same time these civil rules 
proposals were first published.189  Moreover, the ostensible humility 
exhibited in the assertion that “we [the Committee] don’t do a good job” 
of maintaining the forms is belied by the fact that almost all the 
Committee members formerly practiced or currently practice at huge, 
well-known law firms that undoubtedly maintain reams of forms for use 
by their attorneys.190       
The assertion by Judge Campbell and other Committee members that 
“[n]obody uses the forms”191 was apparently supported only by 
unspecified “informal inquiries.”192   But the assertion is belied by 
federal courts’ continued reliance on the forms as guideposts for 
pleading.193   
 
 187. Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 119–20. 
 188. FED. R. CIV. P. 84, advisory committee note to 1946 amendment. 
189.  PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 43, at 6.  Bankruptcy rules amendments, however, do not 
go through the full Rules Enabling Act process. 
 190. See infra Part IV.B. 
 191. Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 120. 
192.  May 2013 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 5, at 68 (“the Rule 84 Subcommittee was formed 
to study Rule 84 and Rule 84 forms. It gathered information about the general use of the forms by 
informal inquiries that confirmed the initial impressions of Subcommittee members. Lawyers do not 
much use these forms . . .”). 
 193. E.g., Garcia-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013) (“the appellant’s 
complaint is plainly modeled on Form 11 of the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The 
complaint disclosed the date, time, and place of the alleged tort, and it delineated both the nature of the 
dangerous condition at the commissary and the resulting injuries to the appellant.  At least two courts of 
appeals have concluded that the standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal does not undermine the 
viability of the federal forms as long as there are sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to make the 
claim plausible.”); Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 687 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Form 15 is a 
complaint for conversion of property, which is the closest analog to plaintiffs’ claims here. Rule 15 
requires a statement of jurisdiction and then an allegation that: ‘On date, at place, the defendant 
converted to the defendant’s own use property owned by the plaintiff. The property converted consists 
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In truth, the seeds of the forms’ destruction were sown in a 2011 
Committee report: 
The form complaints have gained prominence in the wake of the 
Twombly and Iqbal decision. . . . Rule 84 commits the courts to the 
proposition that these Forms Suffice.  Lower courts, however, are 
often puzzled about the contrast between this much “simplicity and 
brevity” and the seeming elevated levels of contextual pleading 
described by the Supreme Court.
194
 
It appears that the easiest way for the Committee to resolve the 
puzzling contrast between the form complaints195 and Twombly/Iqbal 
was to eliminate all of the forms.  Many interpret the Committee’s 
abrogation of the forms as the final nail in the coffin of notice pleading 
and a sub silentio ratification of Twombly and Iqbal.  Over 100 law 
professors joined in a public comment opposing the abrogation of the 
forms for just this reason.196  It is likely that the primary reason the 
Committee abrogated the forms was to eliminate plaintiffs’ 
inconvenient argument that Twombly cited Form 11, the form that 
demonstrates how to plead a negligence claim, approvingly.
197
      
 
of describe.’  With the addition of allegation of the value of the property and a demand for relief, the 
complaint is sufficient.”); Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) (“As incorporated by 
Rule 84, Form 13 makes clear that an allegation in any negligence claim that the defendant acted as 
plaintiff’s ‘employer’ satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice pleading requirement for this element.  Here, 
consistent with Form 13, Hamilton alleged that he was ‘employed’ by the Palms.”); Harris v. Rand, 682 
F.3d 846, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Consistent with Rule 8 and § 1332(c)(1), Form 7(a) in the Appendix 
of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets out a proposed format for alleging 
diversity. . . . Form 7(a) requires more than just a recitation of the legal conclusion that the parties are 
diverse.  It requires the assertion of facts regarding the location of a party’s principal place of business.  
Those factual allegations are entitled to a presumption of truth under Twombly and Iqbal.”).  See also, 
e.g., Villa v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 1:13CV953, 2014 WL 800450, at *4 n.3 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2014) 
(“Form 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourages pleading an affirmative defense based on 
the statute of limitations as follows: ‘The plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations because 
it arose more than ____ years before this action was commenced.’”). 
194.  May 2011 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 57, at 55.  See also Dec. 2011 Advisory Comm. 
Rep., at 13, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-
committee-rules-civil-procedure-december-2011 (“The Twombly and Iqbal decisions create serious 
tensions with the form pleadings included with the Civil Rules.”). 
 195. See Illustrative Civil Rules Forms, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/illustrative-civil-rules-forms (forms 10–21) (last visited May 
13, 2015). 
 196. JONATHAN SIEGEL, COMMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0493 (comment filed on 
behalf of 110 law professors opposing abrogation of the forms).  See also Brooke Coleman, Comment 
(Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-
0002-0654 (arguing that abrogation of the forms requires separate publication and opportunity for public 
comment, else it violates the Rules Enabling Act), 
197.  Form 11 breezily states in its entirety (other than its statement of jurisdiction and damages), 
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But the problem with abrogating the forms extends well beyond the 
sufficiency of pleading a claim for relief.  The forms also illustrate 
numerous other essential steps in federal procedure, from how to 
properly plead the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction to 
what a judgment looks like.198  These forms are helpful to pro se 
litigants, as well as new lawyers and small-firm practitioners who lack 
the experience or resources to access the extensive collection of forms 
available to large-firm practitioners.    
D. Rule 34: The Only Proposed Rule Change That Might Benefit 
Plaintiffs 
Two of the pending changes to Rule 34 were about the only 
amendments that most plaintiffs’ lawyers favored.199  First, the parties 
will be able to deliver document requests earlier.  Currently, parties are 
not allowed to serve formal discovery requests, including document 
requests under Rule 34, until after the lawyers’ Rule 26(f) conference.200  
The amended rule shortens the waiting period for “delivering” document 
requests, which will now be able to be delivered twenty-one days after 
the defendant has been served with process – potentially more than three 
months earlier than document requests are currently allowed to be 
served.201   Theoretically, this will allow a more fruitful discussion at the 
26(f) conference, when the document request will be deemed to be 
“served,” making the responses due thirty days thereafter. As noted 
above, however, the court will have discretion to put off the Rule 26(f) 
conference, and thereby put off the due date for the responses to the 
document requests.202 
The second change to Rule 34 that may help plaintiffs is that the 
parties will be subject to greater specificity in responding and objecting 
 
“On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.” 
198.  FED. R. CIV. P., Form 7 (subject matter jurisdiction); Forms 70 & 71 (judgment).  Other forms 
include how to write a caption and a signature block (Forms 1 and 2); how to note a party’s death or 
state reasons for omitting a party under Rule 19(a) (Forms 8 and 9); how to answer and move to dismiss 
(Forms 30, 31, and 40); how to bring in a third-party defendant or intervene (Forms 41 and 42); how to 
request the production of documents or admissions under Rule 36 (Forms 50 and 51); how to report on 
the parties’ 26(f) meeting (Form 52); and how to consent to a magistrate (Forms 80, 81, and 82).      
199.  See, e.g., Summary of Testimony and Comments, supra note 36, at 42, 74, 115. 
200.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(2).  Currently, the court may order earlier discovery.  Id.  The pending 
rule will also allow the parties to stipulate to earlier discovery.  May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra 
note 2, at 32.  
201.  The amended Rule 34(b)(2)(A) will read, “The party to whom the request is directed must 
respond in writing within 30 days after being served or—if the request was delivered under Rule 
26(d)(2)—within 30 days after the parties’ first Rule 26(f) conference.  A shorter or longer time may be 
stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.”   
202.   See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
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to a document request.  The pending amendments to Rule 34(b)(2)(B) 
and (C) read: 
 
 (B) Responding to Each Item.  For each item or category, the 
response must either state that inspection and related activities 
will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the 
grounds for objecting to the request with specificity, including 
the reasons.  The responding party may state that it will produce 
copies of documents or of electronically stored information 
instead of permitting inspection.  The production must then be 
completed no later than the time for inspection stated in the 
request or a later another reasonable time stated in the response. 
(C) Objections.  An objection must state whether any responsive 
materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.  An 
objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit 
inspection of the rest. * * * 
 This amendment attempts to respond to the concern, mainly 
expressed by plaintiffs’ attorneys, that defendants responding to 
document requests often include boilerplate objections and fail to 
indicate whether they are withholding responsive documents.203  
Although some commenters expressed doubt that the amendment would 
have any practical effect,204 it is at least a morsel of recognition of 
plaintiffs’ side of the discovery wars. 
III. THE MOUNTAIN OF MANUFACTURED “EMPIRICAL SUPPORT” FOR THE 
AMENDMENTS VERSUS THE MOUNTAIN OF REAL, EXISTING 
EMPIRICAL DATA THAT WASN’T EXAMINED 
A. The Opinion Surveys 
When accused of lacking an empirical basis showing that discovery is 
currently “not proportional” to the case, the Committee has two 
reflexive answers.  The first is that the FJC study showed that 25% of 
lawyers surveyed think that discovery is disproportional.205  The second 
is that the “empirical research” prepared for the Duke Conference, other 
than the FJC study, shows high levels of dissatisfaction with 
discovery.206  Neither of these answers is accurate.   
First, as stated earlier, the FJC study actually found that about 90% of 
 
203.   See, e.g., Summary of Testimony and Comments, supra note 36, at 156, 160. 
204.   See, e.g., id. at 34, 90. 
205.  E.g., May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 6. 
206.  E.g., id. at 6–7. 
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all attorneys believed that discovery had yielded “just the right amount” 
or even “too little” information.207  Second, most of the other so-called 
“empirical research” conducted for the Duke Conference consisted of 
opinion surveys, not studies of actual case files.  This is problematic 
because people’s perceptions are subject to a variety of psychological 
biases that distort objective reality.208 Had the opinion surveys (other 
than the FJC study) conducted for the Duke Conference been the subject 
of a Daubert motion to strike, it is likely that the judges on the 
Committee would found the surveys unreliable and inadmissible.  For 
example, Committee member Judge Pratter stated in an opinion on the 
requirements for a reliable and admissible opinion survey: 
 A court must consider several factors when determining whether 
[an opinion] survey meets applicable standards: 
 A proper universe must be examined and a representative sample 
must be chosen; the persons conducting the survey must be experts; 
the data must be properly gathered and accurately reported.  It is 
essential that the sample design, the questionnaires and the manner of 
interviewing meet the standards of objective surveying and statistical 
techniques.  Just as important, the survey must be conducted 
independently of the attorneys involved in the litigation.  The 
interviewers or sample designers should, of course, be trained, and 
ideally should be unaware of the purposes of the survey or the 
litigation.  A fortiori, the respondents should be similarly unaware.
209
 
Almost none of these conditions for a reliable survey was present in 
the opinion surveys conducted by the American Bar Association, the 
American College of Trial Lawyers, and other lawyers’ organizations.210  
The FJC’s study was by far the best-designed and most probative,211 
because it randomly selected attorneys of record on all cases that closed 
in the last quarter of 2008.212  To study whether litigation was “too 
expensive,” the FJC asked those attorneys to focus on the actual costs in 
the case that had just closed, rather than asking them about their overall 
impressionistic beliefs about discovery, as did the other studies. 
 
207.  See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
 208. E.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 161.  See also Reda, supra note 48, at 1101 n. 46 (“The data 
presented were mostly attorney opinion surveys that provided data on what beliefs attorneys have about 
the civil procedural system.  It generally did not collect data that could provide information on how the 
system actually operates.”). 
 209. Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 315, 319–20 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (internal 
citation omitted). 
210.  See 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, supra note 22. 
211.  See Reda, supra note 48, at 1110 (“the closed-case study methodology goes some way to 
alleviating the flaws of attorney opinion surveys”). 
 212. See generally FJC CASE-BASED REPORT, supra note 16. 
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The FJC found that plaintiffs’ attorneys (1,033 of them) estimated a 
median of $15,000 in total litigation costs in the closed case, if at least 
one type of discovery had occurred.213  Plaintiffs’ attorneys then 
estimated that discovery costs accounted for 20% of those total litigation 
costs.214  Defendants’ attorneys (945 of them) estimated a median of 
$20,000 in total litigation costs in the closed case (again if at least one 
type of discovery had occurred),215 of which 27% was attributable to 
discovery costs.216 
Thus, referring to actual closed cases rather than subjective 
impressions, attorneys reported discovery costs per case (in cases that 
had had any discovery) of about $3,000 for plaintiffs (20% of $15,000) 
and $5,400 for defendants (27% of $20,000).  Without minimizing what 
is surely a substantial amount of money to some litigants, an American 
today can barely get good legal representation in a contested divorce for 
this amount of money.  How much lower is the “right” amount for a 
federal case, according to the proponents of change?217       
Moreover, the FJC found that defendants’ median litigation costs had 
actually decreased (when adjusted for inflation) since its previous 
similar study in 1997.218  In addition, the percentage of total litigation 
costs attributable to discovery costs has substantially decreased since 
1997 (from 50% to 20% for plaintiffs and from 50% to 27% for 
defendants).219      
When relying on surveys other than the FJC study, the Committee 
failed to recognize their methodological problems, such as the subjective 
way that questions were posed.  When lawyers are asked whether 
discovery “costs too much” or is “disproportional” to the stakes in the 
litigation, different lawyers perceive these concepts very differently.  
Because most David-and-Goliath cases involve an asymmetry of 
information (defendant has all the information, plaintiff has little or 
none), defendants’ counsel tends to think that “too much” discovery 
arises when plaintiffs ask for things, and plaintiffs’ counsel tends to 
think that discovery “costs too much” when defendants fight 
 
 213. Id. at 35–36. 
 214. Id. at 38.  
 215. Id. at 36–37.   
 216. Id. at 38–39. 
 217. See id. at 776 (“[T]he question should be put to the authors of the LCJ [Lawyers for Civil 
Justice] report to specify what the appropriate outlay for litigation would be, if, as the LCJ argues, the 
reported costs are too high.”). 
 218. Id. at 36 (internal citation omitted).  Defendants’ costs had risen since 1997, though, at the 
95th percentile.  Id.  
 219. Id. at 37. 
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production.220 
Stepping back, why do opinion surveys on real-world discovery need 
to be done to the exclusion of traditional legal research?  Each federal 
judge has funding for at least two full-time law clerks, who are normally 
recent graduates of top law schools with experience on the editorial 
board of their law review.  Most non-judicial Advisory Committee 
members practice at large law firms with plenty of law clerks or 
associates available for research.  Some of the naked assumptions that 
the Committee made, such as courts failing to consider proportionality 
in discovery, would have been easily researchable by such law clerks.221 
Even the FJC could not simply consult case files to determine the 
answers to some of these questions, such as how many depositions, for 
example, were actually taken in cases.  This is because the rules prohibit 
discovery materials such as depositions and interrogatories from being 
filed in court.222  So the FRCP prevent some of the most pertinent 
information about the “cost and delay” associated with civil discovery – 
real court files – from containing that information.   
B. Government Caseload Statistics 
A more objective and reliable measure of “delay” in civil litigation 
than attorney opinions is case disposition time, one of the multitude of 
government caseload statistics maintained by the AO.  The AO’s 
statistics show that the median disposition time for a civil case (from 
case filing to final disposition) has maintained stability for twenty-five 
years, from seven months in 1986 to a still-brisk 8.5 months in 2013, a 
difference of about forty-five days. 223    
Moreover, the federal district courts’ civil caseload has hardly 
 
 220. See, e.g., Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 166 (statement of Kathryn Dickson) (“What 
the plaintiffs were complaining about [when one of the studies reported plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with 
discovery] is the endless meet and confers, the number of times we have to go in on motions to compel, 
the number of times we have to move to quash overbroad subpoenas for every employer your client’s 
ever worked for, for every medical record since they were born.  Those things cost us money and time.  
That’s what the plaintiffs were complaining about, not that . . . there’s too much discovery.”). 
221. Many other questions could have been researched and would have informed the policy debate: 
Who files motions to compel discovery more often, plaintiffs or defendants?  Does the success rate on 
motions to compel vary depending on whether the movant is plaintiff or defendant?  Do courts 
distinguish between discovery that seeks information “relevant to the claims and defenses” and 
information that is “relevant to the subject matter of the action”?  Have parties resisting discovery 
argued that “information about the existence and location of documents” should not be discoverable?  
How often do parties move for leave to exceed ten depositions or 25 interrogatories, and how often does 
the judge deny the motion?  How often do courts cite to the official FRCP forms?  
 222. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.  Discovery materials may be filed when they are attached to a pertinent 
motion, such as a motion to compel or a motion for summary judgment. 
 223. Moore, supra note 3, at 1199. 
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changed in twenty-seven years.  The raw number of civil filings in 
federal district court has increased only 12% since 1986 to 2013.224  
During the same time period, real disposable personal income per capita 
in the United States grew about 56%, and the United States population 
grew about 32%.225   
In addition, the number of filled (not vacant) federal district court, 
senior judge, and full-time magistrate judge positions increased 28% 
from 1986 to 2013.226  The average district court judge in 2013 had 
about the same civil caseload as the average district court judge had in 
1986.  Unweighted civil filings per authorized district court judgeship 
declined 10% since 1986, from 445 in 1986 to 400 in 2013.227  Weighted 
civil filings per authorized district court judgeship went from 408 in 
1986 to 432 in 2013, an increase of only 6%.228  This is true even though 
the AO changed its weighting system in 2004 to give more weight to 
civil cases and less weight to criminal cases.229  Moreover, the AO’s 
figures for weighted and unweighted civil filings per authorized 
judgeship include only district court judges in the denominator, and 
ignore the increasingly heavy work of senior judges and magistrate 
judges.230   
True, the total number of cases per authorized judgeship since 1986 
has risen, but criminal filings, not civil filings, have been entirely 
responsible for that increase.231  But it is difficult to find any recognition 
by the Advisory Committee of the adverse effect of the federal criminal 
docket on federal civil litigation.    
C. Data and Information Compiled Under the Civil Justice Reform 
Act of 1990 
The Federal courts are suffering today under the scourge of two 
related and worsening plagues.  First, the costs of civil litigation, and 
delays that contribute to those costs, are high and are increasing; 
they limit access to the courts to only those who can afford to pay the 
 
 224. Id. at 1187.   
 225. Id.   
 226. Id. at 1188. 
 227. Id. at 1190. 
 228. Id. at 1193. 
 229. FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, 2003-2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY 4–6 (2005), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.nsf/ 
inavgeneral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/665 (select “2003-2004 District Court Case-
Weighting Study”). 
230. Moore, supra note 3, at 1189–90. 
 231. Id. at 1181.  See also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
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rising expenses; and they undermine the ability of American 
corporations to compete both domestically and abroad.  Second, the 
Federal courts have a scarcity of resources, particularly Article III 
judges.  This is especially true in jurisdictions that have high drug-
related caseloads. 
 Although one could be forgiven for thinking that the quotation above 
was uttered in support of the recently-proposed amendments, it was 
actually written in 1990 in connection with the CJRA.232  The 
sentiments expressed today in favor of “discovery reform” are almost 
exactly the same as in 1990.233  But from the Advisory Committee’s 
commentary on the new amendments, one would think that the “cost and 
delay” of civil litigation had never been studied before. 
In fact, the idea that United States courts are subject to unacceptable 
costs and delays goes back to at least the 1950s234 and has continued 
unabated to the present day.235  Indeed, concern with the so-called “cost 
and delay” of dispute resolution has been expressed since the dawn of 
recorded history: in the book of Exodus, Moses’ father-in-law advised 
him to appoint more judges to reduce Moses’ caseload, because the 
people “stood around him from morning till evening.”236  
One of the CJRA’s innovations was to require all active and senior 
district court judges and all magistrate judges to report, twice a year, 
how many fully-briefed motions have been pending before them without 
 
 232. S. Rep. 101-416, supra note 26, at 6804. 
 233. Compare, e.g., id. at 6808 (“The Civil Justice Reform Act addresses the dual problems of 
cost and delay in Federal civil litigation”) with May 2014 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 2, at 3 (“the 
disposition of civil actions could be improved, reducing cost and delay”); compare S. Rep. 101-416, 
supra note 26, at 6808 (“For the middle class of this country . . . the courthouse door is rapidly being 
slammed shut”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) with PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 
43, at 268 (“The proposed amendments aim to decrease the cost of civil litigation, making it more 
accessible for average citizens”); compare S. Rep. 101–416, supra note 26, at 6808 (“Costs of discovery 
can be so high that they force settlements that would not occur”) with Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, 
at 81 (statement of David Howard, corporate vice president and deputy general counsel of Microsoft 
Corp.) (“We have overpaid in cases to settle, to avoid the burden and expensive discovery”).  
 234. E.g., HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN, JR. & BERNARD BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 
(1959); A. LEO LEVIN & EDWARD A. WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1961); Albert Conway, Congested Calendars—and Why, 6 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1 (1956–57). 
 235. See generally, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: 
PROJECT REPORTS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS (1984); AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ATTACKING LITIGATION 
COSTS AND DELAY: ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY (1984); STEVEN 
FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
(1977); JANE ADLER ET AL., THE PACE OF LITIGATION: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (1982); BARRY 
MAHONEY ET. AL., CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS (1988); THOMAS CHURCH, JR., ET AL., JUSTICE 
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978).  
 236. Exodus 18:13–18 (New International Version).  
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a ruling for more than six months.237  The CJRA recognized that judges, 
as well as litigants, bore responsibility for case “delay”: “A significant 
problem in Federal litigation is the undue delay often associated with the 
resolution of motions.”238  After the CJRA reporting requirements went 
into effect, many districts reported declines in their old motions backlog 
when the judges helped each other out, used visiting judges to hear the 
heavy docket of criminal cases, and hired more law clerks.239 
Figure 1 below graphs the number of motions pending more than six 
months in civil cases in September of each year from 1991 (the first year 
of required reporting under the CJRA) to 2013.  The number fell from 
13,083 motions pending in September 1991 to 5,476 motions in 
September 2013.  Bear in mind that in this same time period, the total 
number of federal civil cases filed rose from 210,424 (in 1991) to 




 237. However, the definition of how long a motion is “pending” appears to allow some room for 
manipulation by a district court judge: 
A motion becomes pending 30 days after the date it was filed or was referred to a magistrate 
judge, whichever is later.  If no decision on a motion has been filed within six months after the 
date the motion became pending, and the motion has not been referred to a magistrate judge, the 
motion shall be reported as pending for more than six months before the presiding judicial 
officer.  If a motion is referred to a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge must file a report and 
make a recommendation for or dispose of the motion within six months after the date the motion 
became pending, or else the motion shall be reported as pending for both the district judge and 
the magistrate judge. 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: REPORT OF MOTIONS 
PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BENCH TRIALS SUBMITTED MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, AND CIVIL 
CASES PENDING MORE THAN THREE YEARS ON MARCH 31, 1995 79 (1995) [hereinafter MARCH 1995 
REPORT]. 
238.  S. Rep. 101–416, supra note 26, at 6829. 
 239. E.g., MARCH 1995 REPORT, supra note 237, at 5; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: REPORT OF MOTIONS PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BENCH 
TRIALS SUBMITTED MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, AND CIVIL CASES PENDING MORE THAN THREE YEARS 
ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1995 4 (1995) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 1995 REPORT]. 
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Figure 1: Fully briefed motions pending more than six months in 
federal civil cases, 1991–2013 
 
 
Source: Reports prepared by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts each year, as 
mandated by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.  (See, e.g., MARCH 1995 REPORT, supra note 237.)  
The reports are prepared each March and September, but Figure 1 uses only the reports for September. 
 
In a similar vein, the CJRA requires judges to semi-annually report 
the number of bench trials completed but still awaiting decision for 
more than six months.  This figure also decreased after the reporting 
requirement began, from 221 such trials in September 1991240 to 73 such 
trials in September 2013.241 
Finally, the CJRA requires judges to report the number and type of 
cases pending before them more than three years.242  Again, after the 
CJRA reporting requirements went into effect, many districts reported 
declines in their backlog of old cases when judicial vacancies were 
filled, districts emphasized “better overall case management,” case 
 
240.  MARCH 1995 REPORT, supra note 237, at 3. 
241.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: REPORT OF 
MOTIONS PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BENCH TRIALS SUBMITTED MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, 
AND CIVIL CASES PENDING MORE THAN THREE YEARS ON SEPTEMBER 30, 2013  3 (2013). 
 242. S. Rep. 101–416, supra note 26, at 6830 (“A related problem is the increase in the number of 
civil cases that are more than 3 years old. . . . According to the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, the percentage of civil cases more than 3 years old has risen in 5 years from 6.3 percent of 
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reporting glitches were fixed, and senior judges made special efforts.243 
Besides reporting how many cases before them have been pending 
more than three years, the judges since 1998 have used codes to 
“explain their reasons for delays” and to indicate the nature of suit in 
these matters.244  There are twenty-nine codes indicating various reasons 
for delay.245  Of particular relevance to the debate about the role of 
discovery in delay of civil cases, Code G is for “extensive discovery 
involved.”  Code AA is “Multidistrict Litigation case” (MDL).  There is 
no explanation of how the codes might overlap.   
In fourteen of twenty-five reports prepared by the AO from 1998 to 
2013 in compliance with the CJRA,246 the number one reason judges 
gave for delay was “MDL.”  Where “MDL” was not the number one 
reason, it was the number two reason in nine additional reports, and the 
number three reason in another report.  The second most common 
reason overall for delay was “complexity of case,” listed as the number 
one reason in seven reports, the number two reason in ten other reports, 
and the number three reason in six additional reports.   
The code for “extensive discovery involved” (Code G) only made the 
top three reasons for delay in one report out of twenty-five (that for 
September 2000, where it was the number two reason).  In eleven of the 
twenty-five reports, the code for “extensive discovery involved” was not 
mentioned at all, and in the other thirteen reports, it was mentioned in 
4% or less of the pending old cases.  
Clearly, multidistrict litigation accounts for the overwhelming 
number of cases pending more than three years.247  But the relationship 
between MDL cases and discovery problems was largely unexplored by 
the Advisory Committee in the development of the pending 
amendments.  Only one speaker at the public hearings specifically 
 
 243. E.g., MARCH 1995 REPORT, supra note 237, at 7; SEPTEMBER 1995 REPORT, supra note 239, 
at 6; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: REPORT OF MOTIONS 
PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BENCH TRIALS SUBMITTED MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, AND CIVIL 
CASES PENDING MORE THAN THREE YEARS ON MARCH 31, 1996 6 (1996). 
 244. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT: REPORT OF MOTIONS 
PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BENCH TRIALS SUBMITTED MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, AND CIVIL 
CASES PENDING MORE THAN THREE YEARS ON MARCH 30, 1998 3 (1998) [hereinafter MARCH 1998 
REPORT]. 
 245. Id. at 68. 
 246. Despite extensive searching, we have not been able to find all of the CJRA reports, which are 
supposed to be publicly available.   
 247. See, e.g., MARCH 1998 REPORT, supra note 244, at 7 (“During the past four CJRA reporting 
periods, the bulk of the three-year-old cases consisted of large numbers of pending breast implant cases 
(under MDL Docket Number 926) assigned to a single judge in the Northern District of Alabama.  For 
the March 31, 1998, reporting period, this judge reported 9,300 three-year-old cases (46 percent of the 
national total).”). 
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attacked MDLs as “carte blanche for unfettered discovery.”248  At times, 
speakers spoke of particular MDLs, such as Deepwater Horizon, without 
any express appreciation that the rules changes would affect MDLs and 
non-MDLs alike.249   
Since 1998, when reporting more-than-three-year-old cases under the 
CJRA, judges have also used codes for nature of suit.250  Without fail, 
the number one type of case pending more than three years is personal 
injury—suits that are largely consolidated in MDLs.  The number two 
type of case pending more than three years is uniformly listed as 
prisoner petitions.  The number three type of more-than-three-year-old 
case has unchangeably been civil rights.   
The Advisory Committee rejected the suggestion that it abandon the 
longstanding insistence on rules trans-substantivity (applying the same 
rules to all sizes and shapes of cases).  But it failed to observe 
(explicitly, at least) the dominance of MDL cases when proposing 
changes to the rules: what may be appropriate for an MDL may not be 
appropriate for a smaller, single case.  Moreover, the second most 
common type of long-pending case, prisoner petitions, rarely have any 
discovery at all.  Civil rights suits, the third most common type of long-
pending case, rely heavily on discovery to uncover enough evidence to 
survive the de rigueur 12(b)(6) motion and summary judgment motion.  
It is those cases that will suffer most the fallout of the new rules. 
In retrospect, the CJRA—despised as it was by many in academia and 
the federal judiciary251—contained several advantageous provisions 
missing from the latest FRCP amendments.  First, it put its money where 
its mouth was: it added sixty-six district court judgeships and eleven 
circuit court judgeships.  Of course, only Congress has the ability to add 
judgeships, and in today’s political climate, the authorization of new 
federal judgeships seems unlikely.  Second, the CJRA suggested that 
local task forces adopt measures such as the imposition of firm trial 
dates, two-tiered discovery, and differentiated case management 
“tracks.”  Many commenters to the pending FRCP amendments 
continued to suggest these things,252 but the Advisory Committee 
rejected them.  Third, the CJRA was realistic in its recognition that the 
explosion of the criminal docket, caused by draconian drug laws, had 
negatively impacted the pace of civil litigation.  The Advisory 
 
 248. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 33. 
 249. E.g., id. at 181. 
 250. E.g., MARCH 1998 REPORT, supra note 244, at 70. 
 251. The CJRA was passed over the opposition of the Judicial Conference.   
 252. E.g., Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 144–45 (statement of William Butterfield) 
(“phased” discovery); Summary of Testimony and Comments, supra note 36, at 37, 38, 86, 203 
(suggesting that the transsubstantivity of the FRCP be abandoned). 
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Committee has not mentioned the criminal docket, which has continued 
to expand since 1990.253   
IV. POLARIZED PUBLIC REACTION TO THE AMENDMENTS, AND WHY 
NEITHER THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOR THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE APPEARS TO CARE 
A. “Queen for a Day”: The Flavor of the Public Hearings 
The speakers during three days of public hearings before the 
Advisory Committee were almost perfectly polarized in their reaction to 
the proposed amendments: plaintiffs’ lawyers and legal academics 
against,254 defense lawyers and corporate representatives in favor.  The 
written comments filed with the Committee mirrored this polarized 
reaction between plaintiffs and defendants.255  A couple of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers told the Committee it should take this polarization as facial 
evidence of the lack of even-handed effect of the proposed changes.256  
Another plaintiff’s lawyer stated that he felt the train had left the station, 
meaning that the Committee had already decided to adopt the 
amendments despite the written comments or public hearings.257   
The Committee has attempted to paint the picture that there is 
bipartisan support for the pending amendments.  For example, the 
Committee’s initial report claimed that the Duke Conference had 
showcased “a wide array of views.”258  I have been unable to find a list 
of the invited attendees, but defense speakers on panels at the Duke 
Conference outnumbered plaintiffs’ speakers almost two-to-one.259  
Judge Pratter took umbrage when a plaintiff’s lawyer suggested that it 
was “transparent” that the proposed changes favored one side over 
another, but the lawyer was only stating the obvious.260        
 
253. Moore, supra note 3, at 1181. 
 254. The only academic who testified in favor of the proposed amendments, Professor William 
Hubbard, was paid for the research he conducted and reported on by the Civil Justice Reform Group, a 
defense-supported organization. Id. at 222. 
 255. See Patricia W. Moore, The Plaintiffs’ Bar Speaks: Will the Advisory Committee Listen?, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE & FED. CTS. BLOG (Jan. 1, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/01/the-plaintiffs-bar-speaks-will-the-advisory-committee-
listen.html.  
 256. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 79–80.   
 257. Id. at 25. 
258.  May 2010 Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 37, at 1. 
259.  See REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 19–23. 
 260. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 302–03. 
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No less than ten members of “DRI--The Voice of the Defense Bar”261 
spoke to the Committee during the three days of hearings.262  At least six 
members of the defense-oriented Lawyers for Civil Justice also spoke,263 
as well as a professor paid by the industry-supported Civil Justice 
Reform Group,264 a member of the International Association of Defense 
Counsel,265 and a partner at Shook, Hardy & Bacon, the same defense 
law firm as Committee member John Barkett.266  Representatives of 
civil rights and consumer public interest organizations spoke also, but 
there was not more than one speaker from any one such organization.   
To some degree, both sides seemed to follow some sort of script.267  
Defendants’ corporate counsel would typically assert that thousands of 
their employees were subject to a litigation hold of some sort, that 
hundreds of millions of pages were being preserved all over the globe, 
that the whole thing was costing them tens of millions of dollars, and yet 
only 0.001% of all those pages were ever used at trial.268  Defense-
 
 261. About DRI, DRI, http://www.dri.org/About (describing itself “the leading organization of 
defense attorneys and in-house counsel.”) (last visited May 16, 2015). 
 262. Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 6, 22, 49, 119; Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 
236, 266; Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 7, 68, 173, 201. 
 263. Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 18, 158, 191, 245; Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 
33, 68. 
 264. Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 221.  Professor William Hubbard was paid to conduct 
survey research on corporations’ preservation expenses.  But in response to a question by Committee 
member Elizabeth Cabraser (the only true plaintiffs’ lawyer on the Committee), Professor Hubbard 
admitted that his data did not distinguish between ESI preserved for potential litigation (which the rules 
changes might affect) and ESI preserved for regulatory or business requirements (which the businesses 
would have to preserve regardless of what the FRCP say).  Id. at 227–28. 
 265. Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 134. 
 266. Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 119. 
 267. Both sides were urged by their affiliated organizations to submit comments and to speak at 
the hearings.  See, e.g., Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 57.   
 268. See, e.g., Nov. 2013 Hearing, supra note 1, at 262-64 (remarks of Malini Moorthy) (“In 
connection with the hormone therapy preservation order, we estimate that Wyeth and Pfizer spent nearly 
$40 million to buy and store the 1.2 million backup tapes that were preserved. . . .  There was no need to 
go to the backup tapes because in the same litigation Pfizer collected millions and millions of documents 
from its live data environment, which included retrieving data from more than 170 custodians and more 
than 75 centralized information systems.  From those collection efforts, Pfizer produced approximately 
2.5 million documents, representing more than 25 million pages. Of those 2.5 million documents, we 
estimate that only about 400 company documents were marked as exhibits in the 23 trials that have 
taken place in the litigation to date.”); Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 28 (remarks of Timothy 
Pratt) (“Since 2005, my company [Boston Scientific] has preserved 107 terabytes of data, in just the last 
year, we have preserved 35 terabytes of data, including 90 million messages. Roughly half of our U.S. 
employees are subject to litigation holds.  We pay our outside discovery vendor approximately $32 
million to process, host and provide our document review tool since 2005.  And it’s averaging $5 
million a year right now to that outside discovery vendor. . . .  The requesting party often gets millions 
of documents that have absolutely no bearing on the lawsuit so they are not used.  Estimates vary but my 
best guesstimate is far less than one percent of all produced documents are used for any reason in 
litigation.”).  Very similar narratives were presented by representatives from other notable entities. See 
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oriented speakers also seemed to be parroting the term “gotcha game” to 
describe how corporations would be sanctioned for failure to preserve 
information.269  Plaintiffs’ counsel, on the other hand, would typically 
describe one particular case he or she had handled in which (a) more 
depositions were needed than the current or proposed limit to survive 
summary judgment; (b) broader discovery was needed than is postulated 
to occur if the scope of discovery is narrowed in 26(b)(1);270 and/or (c) 
defense counsel were not cooperative.  
During the testimony of one plaintiffs’ lawyer, Judge Gene E.K. 
Pratter, a member of the Advisory Committee, made what first appeared 
to be a merely bizarre comment.  The witness, Jennie Lee Anderson, 
objected to moving the “proportionality” language in Rule 26(b).  She 
supported, however, the proposed changes to Rule 34 that will require 
more specific objections and allow earlier service of requests for 
production.  She explained: 
In almost every class action that I have litigated, discovery works this 
way: I receive the initial disclosures, which are virtually meaningless.  
And I serve discovery.  I get responses back from the defendants 
which include two to three pages of objections for each 
request . . . and not a single document produced.  Then I spen[d] 
months . . . meeting and conferring with the defendants begging them 
to please tell me what do you mean by expensive?  What is your 
estimated cost?  How many documents are you talking about?  
Real-life examples are so absurd, you are going to find them hard to 
believe.  Recently in an antitrust case we were disputing whether 
certain hard copy documents need to be reviewed.  And I asked them 
to just tell me how many documents are we talking about.  Are you 
talking about a Redweld, or are we talking about five rooms of 
documents?  The response to that query was it’s not a Redweld, it’s 
more than a Redweld.  Not helpful. 
During the questioning that followed Ms. Anderson’s statement, 
Judge Pratter commented: 
I don’t see how there would be a different result to your circumstance 
 
id. at 80 (Microsoft); id. at 92 (Bayer); Feb. 2014 Hearing, supra note 91, at 113–14 (General Electric); 
id. at 123 (Eli Lilly); id. at 187 (Shell Oil); id. at 250 (Ford Motor). 
 269. E.g., id. at 316 (“The result of the current state of the rules is a gotcha game that is 
frequently—it’s not only at our corporate clients, but also at their in-house and outside counsel, and that 
results in . . . over preservation.”); id. at 36 (“gotcha mentality”); id. at 92 (“they used their requests for 
admission process in a way to play gotcha”); id. at 116 (“[sanctions create] very strong incentives to gin 
up sideshow litigation and gotcha games”); Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 178 (“eDiscovery 
oftentimes morphs into improper gotcha tactics”).  
 270. E.g., Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 152. 
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about the snarky response from the defense saying it’s not a Redweld, 
it’s more than a Redweld.  [Presumably, Judge Pratter meant that the 
result would still, even under the proposed amendments, be that the 
judge in the case would order the production if the defendant provided 
no further information about cost and burden.] 
. . . 
Frankly, I think that’s part of the problem with some of the—you’re 
too young to remember this—some of the Queen-For-A-Day issues 
that we’ve been hearing or the examples we’ve been hearing.  And 
that’s a good example.  I don’t see it being a different outcome [if the 
pending amendments are passed].   
In one sense, Judge Pratter’s comment was typical: throughout the 
three days of public hearings, Committee members repeatedly evinced 
disbelief that any federal judge would ever be anything but reasonable, 
and steadfastly refused to recognize that any shift in the rules would 
shift the parties’ negotiating power.  And the reference to the old 
daytime television show “Queen for a Day” may have simply struck 
many observers, especially those “too young to remember,” as quaint or 
even incomprehensible.   
But the reference to “Queen for a Day” illustrates the attitude, 
unconscious or not, that some of the Committee members have about 
plaintiffs.  The show, which aired from 1956 to 1964,271 was described 
on TV.com as follows:   
“Do YOU want to be Queen for a Day?!”  Host [Jack] Bailey would 
bellow out those words before each program, to which the audience 
would reply en masse, “YES!”  Four women, each having a sob story 
to tell, told Bailey why they believed they should be crowned the 
show’s “Queen for a Day.”  Usually, each contestant asked for a 
merchandise prize such as a washer and dryer.  After all four sad 
stories were told, the audience chose the winner by applause 
(determined via the “applause meter”).  The winner was awarded her 




Wikipedia quoted a blogger who called the show “one of the most 
ghastly shows ever produced” and “tasteless, demeaning to women, 
demeaning to anyone who watched it, cheap, insulting and utterly 
degrading to the human spirit.”273  Is that what Judge Pratter thought of 
 
 271. It was briefly revived in 1969–1970. 
 272. Queen for a Day, TV.COM, http://www.tv.com/shows/queen-for-a-day/ (last visited May 15, 
2015).  
 273. Queen for a Day, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen_for_a_Day (last visited 
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all those plaintiff’s lawyers’ specific examples of problematic cases—
maudlin “sob stories” told by women so desperate they were willing to 
debase themselves on national television for consumer trinkets?       
Judge Pratter was appointed to the federal district court by George W. 
Bush in 2004.  She formerly practiced law at Duane Morris, a large 
defense firm.  At the time she was confirmed as a district judge, she was 
a member of the Federalist Society, Defense Research Institute, 
Pennsylvania Defense Institute, and the St. Thomas More Society.  
President Bush later nominated Judge Pratter to the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, but withdrew her name after civil rights groups 
opposed her nomination because of her “seemingly dismissive and even 
hostile attitude to the rights of the disabled and those claiming 
discrimination in employment.”274   
As detailed in the next section, Judge Pratter’s background is typical 
of the members of the Advisory Committee and the Standing 
Committee.   
B. The Ideological, Demographic, and Experiential Biases of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ Advisory Committee and Standing Committee 
At the end of the 1978 version of the movie Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers, Donald Sutherland, recently having transformed from human 
to alien “pod person,” betrays one of the last remaining humans by 
screaming the pods’ “human alert” sound.275  This movie came to mind 
as I was researching the background of the members of the Advisory 
Committee and the Standing Committee.  I may be the last human to 
realize this, but the Federalist Society has body-snatched the federal 
rulemaking apparatus. 
The members and the chairpersons of the Advisory Committee, the 
Standing Committee, and other federal rules committees are appointed 
by Chief Justice John Roberts.276  Theoretically, the committee 
 
May 15, 2015).  
274. Civil Rights Groups Oppose Pratter Nomination, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (Feb. 14, 
2008), http://www.civilrights.org/judiciary/nominees/pratter/civil-rights-groups-oppose.html (last 
visited June 19, 2015).  Judge Pratter’s alleged inability to discern gender discrimination is not 
uncommon in highly successful professional women.  See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, 
WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 163 (2013) (“Other research suggests that once a woman achieves 
success, particularly in a gender-biased context, her capacity to see gender discrimination is reduced.”) 
(citation omitted).  
 275. INVASION OF THE BODY SNATCHERS (Monogram Pictures 1987); see also Monogram 
Pictures, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEStsLJZhzo (providing a video clip of the 
scream).  
 276. Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261 (2009). 
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members’ terms are limited to two terms of three years each,277 but the 
Chief Justice frequently reappoints the members again despite that 
aspirational rule.278  Many scholars have questioned the wisdom, let 
alone the democratic nature, of allocating such unfettered power to one 
unelected individual.279   
One searches in vain for anything in the Rules Enabling Act that 
gives the Chief Justice of the United States this power.  Section 2073 
provides that the Judicial Conference, not the Chief Justice, shall 
appoint the members of the rules committees.280  The delegation to the 
Chief Justice of this power came as a result of a compromise reached in 
the 1950s aboard the Queen Mary.281  
During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts could not 
recall whether he had ever been a member of the Federalist Society, but 
he spoke at the Federalist Society’s 25th Anniversary Gala on 
November 15, 2007.282  It is no secret that the Federalist Society has had 
a key role in reshaping the federal judiciary over the past thirty years.283  
Now it has control of the federal rulemaking process.  Table 2 below 
shows the five chairpersons of the Rules Advisory Committees (Civil 
Procedure, Evidence, Appellate, Bankruptcy, and Criminal) and the 
Chair of the Standing Committee at this writing:  
  
 
 277. Committee Membership Selection, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/committe-membership-
selection.aspx (last visited May 15, 2015). 
278. Dawn M. Chutkow, The Chief Justice as Executive: Judicial Conference Committee 
Appointments, 2 JOURNAL OF LAW & COURTS 301, 309 (2014). 
279.  See, e.g., Resnik & Dilg, supra note 19, at 1584–87; Theodore W. Ruger, The Chief Justice’s 
Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (2006) (noting that 
the Chief Justice’s administrative powers are not constrained, as are his adjudicatory powers, by the 
norms of collective decision-making and reason-giving). 
280.  28 U.S.C. § 2073(b). 
281. See supra note 21; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking  and 
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, U. Penn. Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 14-26, at 7. 
 282. About Us, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/ (last visited May 15, 2015). 
 283. See, e.g., SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE 
TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 156 (2009) (“Certainly the effort in the Reagan administration—
aided by the newly formed Federalist Society—to nominate candidates with conservative, ideological 
records attests to the use of nominations by presidents to pursue a policy agenda.”); JOHN W. DEAN, 
BROKEN GOVERNMENT: HOW REPUBLICAN RULE DESTROYED THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND 
JUDICIAL BRANCHES 146 (2007) (Lee Liberman, co-founder of the Federalist Society, was President 
George H.W. Bush’s “judicial ‘Rasputin,’” promoting Clarence Thomas as replacement for retiring 
Justice Thurgood Marshall); id. at 151 (lawyers from the Federalist Society worked with the White 
House during Thomas’ confirmation hearing to “comb[] for anything and everything to discredit” Anita 
Hill, who alleged Thomas had sexually harassed her).   
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Table 2: Chairpersons of Federal Advisory Committees on Rules of 
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District Evidence Reagan No Vinson & 
Elkins 
 
As shown in Table 2, at least four of the six chairpersons of the 
federal rules advisory committees and the Standing Committee are 
affiliated with the Federalist Society.  A fifth, Judge Fitzwater, has been 
described as one of the country’s “most conservative judges.”284  In 
addition, Judge Sutton clerked for Justice Scalia, and Judge Campbell 
clerked for Justice Rehnquist.   
All of the chairpersons are white, and five of six are male.  Before 
becoming a judge, five of six practiced law with large law firms that 
represent mostly corporations and mostly, in litigation, are on the 
defense side.  The sixth, Judge Colloton, spent some time working for 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. 
 The Chair of the Standing Committee, Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton of the 
Sixth Circuit, practiced law at the Jones Day law firm, where he 
represented such entitles as Wal-Mart,285 the Ohio Chamber of 
 
 284. LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, TURNING RIGHT: JUDICIAL SELECTION 
AND THE POLITICS OF POWER (2004), available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/turning-
right/judges_report.pdf. 
 285. Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001-Ohio-1593, 93 Ohio St. 3d 488, 496, 756 N.E.2d 657, 
658. 
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Commerce,286 and tobacco companies.287  Judge Sutton has moderated at 
least five Federalist Society panels with titles such as “Is There Any 
Remaining Limit to Federal Power?”288  He spoke at Lawyers for Civil 
Justice’s Membership Meeting in May 2013, which focused on the 
economic impact of litigation costs.289  Among the other guest speakers 
at that meeting was Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, general counsel of Bayer 
Corporation, who also spoke in the public hearings before the Advisory 
Committee.290   
 Table 3 below lists, at this writing, the members of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee itself:   
 




















































 286. Ricker v. John Deere Ins. Co., 2000-Ohio-321, 88 Ohio St. 3d 1229, 1230, 725 N.E.2d 281. 
 287. Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 105 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
 288. Is There Any Remaining Limit to Federal Power? – Event Audio/Video, THE FEDERALIST 
SOC’Y (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/detail/is-there-any-remaining-limit-to-
federal-power-event-audiovideo (featuring John C. Eastman, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Jeffrey Rosen, and 
Jeffrey S. Sutton).  
 289. Lawyers For Civil Justice; Standing For Fairness And Meaningful Reform In U.S. Civil 
Litigation, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, June 2013, at 1, 31, available at    
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2013/June/25.pdf. 
 290. Jan. 2014 Hearing, supra note 88, at 3 (Kaspar Stoffelmayr testified at the January 9, 2014 
public hearing before the Advisory Committee in Phoenix, Arizona).   
 291. Shook Hardy’s web site states, “SHB has defeated class certification in over 90 cases—in 
nearly every jurisdiction in the United States and abroad—involving an enormous range of products, 
environmental challenges, and theories of recovery.” Class Action and Complex Litigation, SHOOK, 
HARDY & BACON L.L.P., http://www.shb.com/practice_areas.aspx?id=46 (last visited May 15, 2015). 
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 292. WilmerHale’s web site boasts, “We have compiled a remarkable record of resolving antitrust 
claims through summary disposition, at trial, and on appeal against both private and government 
plaintiffs in the United States.”  WILMERHALE, http://www.wilmerhale.com/litigation/antitrust/ (last 
visited May 15, 2015). 
 293. Mayer Brown’s web site quotes The American Lawyer: “Mayer Brown impressed us with its 
range of far-reaching victories,” one of which was the firm’s Supreme Court win in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, which upheld the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration clause in a consumer contract.  
“We’ve seen some sweeping pro-business US Supreme Court rulings of late, but there’s a good 
argument that no decision will have more impact on the business community.”  Litigation and Dispute 
Resolution, MAYER BROWN, http://www.mayerbrown.com/experience/Litigation-Dispute-Resolution/ 
(last visited May 15, 2015). 
 294. Professor Klonoff was also Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States (1986–
1988) and an Assistant United States Attorney (Criminal Division, District of Columbia) (1983–1986), 
during the Reagan administration. ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CURRICULUM VITAE (2015), available at 
http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/5260-robert-klonoff-cv. 
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G.W. Bush Yes Duane 
Morris 
 
*Judge Nahmias, currently on the Supreme Court of Georgia, was nominated by 
President George W. Bush to be the United States Attorney for the Northern 
District of Georgia.   
 
As shown in Table 3, thirteen of the fifteen members of the Advisory 
Committee had at least one of the following characteristics: they were 
appointed by a Republican president, clerked for a Republican-
appointed Supreme Court justice, work or worked for a defense-
oriented, large corporate law firm, and/or are affiliated with the 
Federalist Society or Lawyers for Civil Justice.295  The other two are 
“tokens,” Judge Oliver as the token African-American and Ms. Cabraser 
as the token “real” plaintiff’s lawyer (and the token non-Federalist 
Society woman).  
Some committee members’ current or former firms claim to represent 
both plaintiffs and defendants, but upon closer examination, the 
plaintiffs represented are large corporations, in such actions as patent 
infringement cases,296 breach of a noncompete agreement,297 or a 
“multibillion-dollar breach of contract action against six banks.”298  
 
        295. See also Burbank & Farhang, supra note 281, at 12 (compiling data showing that from 1960–
2013 “there was a substantial shift away from plaintiff and toward defense representation” on the 
Advisory Committee). 
 296. E.g., Parker C. Folse—Notable Representation, Susman Godfrey L.L.P., 
http://www.susmangodfrey.com/Attorneys/Parker-C-Folse/#Pane7 (Mr. Folse is an Advisory 
Committee member) (last visited May 15, 2015). 
 297. See Employment Litigation, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, 
http://www.debevoise.com/employment-litigation-practice-areas/ (last visited May 15, 2015). 
 298. Commercial Litigation, KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN, TODD, EVANS & FIGEL, P.L.L.C., 
http://www.khhte.com/practices-Commercial-Litigation.html (former law firm of Judge Neil M. 
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Committee member Robert Michael Dow, for example, represented 
Illinois Bell Telephone Company as a plaintiff.299 
Of the fifteen members of the Advisory Committee, twelve are white 
males (as are the two Reporters for the Committee and the Liaison to the 
Standing Committee), two are white females, and one is an African-
American male.  Of the federal judge members, four were appointed by 
Democratic presidents (two Clinton and two Obama) and four were 
appointed by Republican presidents (all George W. Bush), including the 
Chair of the Advisory Committee.  Although that lineup looks well-
balanced, the Bush-appointed judges include the Committee chair.  
Judge Grimm, although appointed by Obama, has spoken at LCJ 
meetings.300  Moreover, the “liaison” from the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee to the Standing Committee is Neil Gorsuch, a Federalist 
Society member, George W. Bush appointee, and former clerk for 
Justice White.   
Table 4 shows that the members of the Standing Committee have 
characteristics and backgrounds similar to those of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee:      
 


















































Gorsuch) (last visited May 15, 2015). 
 299. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Village of Itasca, 503 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
300. See, e.g., Join LCJ, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, http://www.lfcj.com/join-lcj.html 
(“Speakers from recent conferences have included . . . Judge Paul W. Grimm”) (last visited June 19, 
2015); Lawyers For Civil Justice (LCJ), Goals And Achievements, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE 
COUNSEL, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/20628/lawyers-civil-justice-lcj-goals-and-
achievements (last visited June 19, 2015) (reporting that Judge Grimm was a confirmed speaker at 
LCJ’s November 2012 program). 
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G.W. Bush  Robison 
Curphey 
 
*Justice Jefferson was appointed Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court in 2004 
by Governor Rick Perry.
301
 




 301. Alumnus Wallace B. Jefferson, ‘88, Appointed First African American Chief Justice of Texas 
Supreme Court, UNIV. TEX. AUSTIN SCH. L. (Sept. 14, 2004), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/2004/091404_jefferson.html. 
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Of the eight current or former federal judges on the Standing 
Committee, seven were appointed by George W. Bush.  Other members 
have ties to the latter Bush administration or to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.302 
Other than Elizabeth Cabraser, it appears that no member of the 
Advisory or Standing Committee has represented plaintiffs on a 
contingency fee basis.  Thus, although several speakers emphasized the 
point,303 the Committee members have not personally experienced the 
reality that plaintiffs’ attorneys on a contingent fee have no economic 
incentive to spend any more time or effort than necessary to develop the 
case in discovery.  
C. The Agenda and Remarkable Success of the Federalist Society 
and Its Affiliates 
One of the Federalist Society’s officers wrote a book outlining his 
call to “break the left’s stranglehold on the courts” by appointing “good 
conservative” judges like Samuel Alito.304  A recent study of the 
Federalist Society asserts, “Every single federal judge appointed by 
President G.H.W. Bush or President George W. Bush was either a 
member or approved by members of the [Federalist] Society,”305 
including the Society’s most prominent appointees, Supreme Court 
Justices Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas.  Not coincidentally, the 
Federalist Society has been a champion of the types of civil justice 
“reforms” exemplified in the pending FRCP amendments:  
Although The Federalist Society professes to take no official stand 
on controversial legal policy issues, the organization coordinates its 
activities with other conservative groups in favor of tort reform.  The 
Lawyers for Civil Justice, a pro-tort reform alliance, hosted a meeting 
for industry and defense bar leaders including the “United States 
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2015).  Larry D. Thompson was deputy Attorney General of the United States under George W. Bush 
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49, 217, 297. 
 304. MARK W. SMITH, DISROBED: THE NEW BATTLE PLAN TO BREAK THE LEFT’S 
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Chamber of Commerce, Federalist Society, Defense Research 
Institute, [and the] American Tort Reform Association” to “improve 
the coordination among several groups already addressing . . . issues” 
such as tort reform.
306
  
What Jeffrey Toobin has called “the full Federalist Society agenda” 
initially held “that the justices should interpret the Constitution 
according to the original intent of the framers, that Congress had 
repeatedly passed laws that infringed on executive power and violated 
the Constitution, and that the crown jewels of liberal jurisprudence—
from Miranda to Roe [v. Wade] should be overruled.”307  By the late 
1980s, however, the Federalist Society’s agenda had grown to 
encompass so-called “civil justice reform” or “tort reform.”308   
Co-founders of the Federalist Society gave birth to big business’ anti-
litigation agenda and steadily moved it front and center in the national 
debate.  David McIntosh, a co-founder of the Federalist Society at the 
University of Chicago (Justice Scalia was the faculty advisor), joined 
Vice President Dan Quayle’s Council on Competitiveness, which in 
1991 issued one of the first reports condemning civil litigation and 
linking it to dwindling competitiveness of American business abroad.309  
This report, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, advanced the 
now-familiar procedural mechanisms advocated by tort reformers to 
limit lawsuits, such as limits on punitive damages, loser-pays, and 
employment of contract provisions mandating ADR.310  The Federalist 
Society coordinates its tort reform efforts through defense-oriented 
lobbying groups such as LCJ, DRI, and the American Tort Reform 
Association.311   
As with the term “justice,” the term “reform” is in the eyes of the 
beholder.  These so-called “reforms” use changes in procedural rules to 
erect barriers to filing and maintaining lawsuits and to lower the cost of 
lawsuits for the (mostly) business entities defending them—in other 
words, procedural changes exactly like the amendments now recently 
pushed through by the Advisory Committee and Standing Committee.   
LCJ calls itself “a partnership of corporations and defense 
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attorneys.”312  LCJ’s top priorities for this round of changes to the 
FRCP313 were restricting the scope of discovery and imposing a 
forgiving sanctions standard for failure to preserve ESI; these changes 
are enshrined in the pending amendments.314  LCJ also lobbied strongly 
for further restrictions on pleading, asserting “Rule 8 imposes no 
meaningful hurdle to instigation of a civil action . . .”315  Although the 
Committee ultimately decided not to amend Rule 8 itself, its abrogation 
of the bare-bones Forms took a step in that direction.  
The pending amendments also give a nod to another of LCJ’s 
priorities for the FRCP – the “requester pays” discovery rule obliquely 
mentioned in amended Rule 26(c).  LCJ continues to lobby to strengthen 
the “requester pays” rule by making it the default position in civil 
litigation.316     
V. CONCLUSION 
With Chief Justice Roberts in control of the federal rules advisory 
committees for the foreseeable future—possibly decades—the future of 
discovery will likely hold further restrictions on the ability to obtain 
information.  The judges on the Advisory Committee are not obliged to 
be impartial in evaluating procedural rules changes; they are only 
obliged to follow the Rules Enabling Act process of publication and 
comment. 
 Many of the pending amendments can be traced to LCJ’s and other 
defense groups’ lobbying efforts.317  The only item on the discovery-
related wish list of corporate and defense-oriented organizations that 
was not fully achieved with the currently pending amendments was a 
default rule that the requesting party (normally plaintiff) should pay the 
costs of responding to discovery requests incurred by the responding 
party (normally the defendant).  These well-funded organizations will 
not rest until that ultimate prize is enshrined in the rules.  
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